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WOODSON
and HAXTON

v.
NORTH CAROLINA

Cert to N.C. SC
(Sharp, .Q.:I., Exum, :I·,
specially concurring)
State/Criminal
- Stay Granted By North Carolina SC]

1.

SU}l}1ARY:

This is the first petition for cert

challenging the constitutionality of a death sentence made
pursu ant to the post-State v. Waddell (194 SE2d 19) death
penalty statute enacted April 8, 1974 (N.C. Sess. Laws 1973
[2d Sess., 1974), c. 1201, § 1, amending N.C. Gen. Stat.
§

,,

14-17 [1974 cum. supp.]) by the North Carolina legislature.

- 2 -

2.

FACTS & CONTENTIONS:

Petrs Waxton (aged 24)

and Woodson (23) and two other black men -- Tucker (18) and
Carroll (19) -- planned the armed robbery of an E-Z Shop in
Dunn, N.C.

Tucker and petr Waxton entered the store while

Carroll and petr Woodson remained in a car outside.
the robbery, Tucker killed the white shop assistant.
were indicted for first-degree felony murder.

During
All four

The State allowed

Tucker and Carroll to plead guilty to lesser (non-capital) offenses in return for their testimony at trial.
testified in their own defense.

All four men

The jury convicted petrs of first-

degre e murder and the court imposed the mandatory death sentence
pursuant to the new North Carolina law.
North Carolina SC affirmed.
. ~hat

It rejected petrs' arguments

the death sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.
a.

Petrs

(~-vhose

petition \vas prepared by NAACP

Legal Defense Fund) reiterate the contentions set out in Fowler
v. North Carolina (No. 73-7031).

They claim that the new statute

does not make imposition of the death penalty in North Carolina
any less arbitrary than it was before.

They note that the death

penalty is still discussed on voir dire of the venire, that the
trial judge may instruct the jury that death is mandatory, if the y
find first-degree murder, and that defense counsel is entitled to
tell the jury during summation that death will result to defendc.:-.:::s
on a finding of first-degree murder.

The result, according to

petrs, is that juries are tempted to find guilt on lesser

- 3 -

(non-cupital) included offenses in sympathetic cases -- thus
rendering non-mandatory in fact the mandatory penalty.
Petrs also contend that the death sentences in
this case demonstrate the arbitrary infliction of the
punishment:

neither petr did the actual killing, and petr

Woodson was not even in the store at the time of the killing.
b.
4.

Resp concedes this is a hold for Fmvler.

DISCUSSION:

This is a hold for Fowler, unless the

Court wishes to take a post-Waddell statutory case and/or one

in which prosecutoria1 discretion and the felony-murder rule
provide &

11

gloss" on mandatory death penalties.

There is a response.
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Woodson v. North Carolina
Capital Case - North Carolina Statute

Mandatory sentence of death whenever the defendant is
convicted of one of a series of specified crimes.
Statute is not limited to a few particularly heinous
crimes.

It provides for capital punishment in all cases of

felony murder, and for murder "perpetrated by means of poison,
lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing".
This seems to be the statutory equivalent of North
Carolina's post-Furman judicial construction of its earlier
statute.
Jury discretion remains wide.

If it thinks capital

punishment is inappropriate, the jury in a felony murder case
may (i) convict, not for murder, but only an attempt to commit
the felony; (ii) convict

on a lesser-included offense, but

only if there is evidence to support it, or (iii) refuse to
convict the defendant of anything.
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7
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS:
The question in this case is whether the imposition of a death
sentence for the crime of first degree murder under the law of
North Carolina violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
I

The petitioners in this case were convicted of participation in an armed robbery of a convenience food store, in the course
of which the cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded.
There were four participants in .t he robbery: the petitioners Tyrone
Woodson and Luby Waxton, and

~wo

others, Leonard Tucker and

Johnnie Lee Carroll. ·Tucker and Carroll testified for the prosecution after being permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses; Woodson
and Waxton testified on their own behalf.

'

'

)tJ

75-5491, Woodso1'(
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According to the testimony, the four men had been discus s ing
a possible robbery for some time. On the day of the robbery, June 3,
197 4, Woodson and Tucker drank two bottles of wine together.
Woodson then left Tucker and went over to the mobile home where
he was staying with a friend and continued drinking. About 9:30p.m.,
Waxton and Tucker came to the trailer. When Woodson came out,
Waxton hit him. Waxton testified that he struck Woodson because
he said something to "disrespect" him; Tucker and Woodson testified
that Waxton wanted Woodson to sober up and come along on the robbery.
The three went to Waxton' s trailer where they met Carroll,
who had borrowed his brother's car for the evening. Waxton,
according to the testimony of the others, armed himself with a
nickel-plated derringer. Tucker handed Woodson a rifle, which he
carried into the front seat of !he car. The four then set out.
Carroll was driving, with Woodson in the front seat next to him.
Tucker and Waxton rode in

th~

back seat. The first time they came

to the store, they passed by because there were too many customers .
.

They drove up a dirt road where Woodson got out of the car and tested
the rifle. They then returned to the store.

75-5491, Woodson
- 3-

Tucker and Wa.xton got out of the car and went into the store
while Carroll and Woodson remained outside as lookouts. Tucker
asked for, received, and paid for a package of Kools. Wa.xton in
turn asked for cigarettes. As the cashier, Mrs. Shirley Whittington
Butler, handed the pack to him, Wa.xton pulled the derringer out of
his hip pocket, placed it against Mrs. Butler's neck and fired one ·
shot. Mrs. Butler fell backwards, fatally wounded. Waxton took
the money tray from the register and gave it to Tucker, who carried
it from the store. As he reached the door, Tucker ran into a
customer, said "look out" and pushed past him. After he was outside, Tucker heard a second shot from inside the store, and a couple
of minutes later Wa.xton came out, walking fast and carrying a handful of paper money. Tucker and Wa.xton got in the car ai?-d the four
drove away.
Wa.xton' s testimony ag~eed in most respects, except that
he claimed he never had a gun and Tucker had shot both the cashier
and the customer.
The four men were arrested and indicted for first degree
murder and armed robbery. Waxton was also indicted for assault

1/

with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill, not resulting in death.

75-5491, Woods
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Before the trial of the two petitioners, Tucker and Carroll, had

2/
both been permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses.

During

trial Waxton asked to be allowed to plead guilty to the same lesser
offenses to which Tucker had pleaded guilty, but the Solicitor re-

_1_/
fused to accept the pleas.

Woodson maintained throughout the trial

that he had been coerced by Waxton, that he was therefore innocent,
and that he would not consider pleading guilty to anything.
The petitioners were found guilty on all charges, and, as
was required by

statute, sentenced to death. The Supreme Court

of North Carolina affirmed State v. Woodson, 215 S. E. 2d 607,
287 N.C. 578 (1975 ). We granted certiorari,

U.S.

--

to consider whether the imposition of the death penalty in these cases
comports with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. We now reverse.
North Carolina, prior to 1972, provided that in cases of
first degree murder, the jury could in its unbridled discretion choose
whether the convicted defendant should be sentenced to death or to
life imprisonment.

_!I

After the decision of this Court in Furman v.

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court of North Carolina
in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S. E 2d 19 (1973 ), interpreted
Furman as holding that the death penalty could not be imposed by a

-

75-5491, VVoodson
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judge or jury who was free to act arbitrarily, but not that the death
penalty was per se cruel and unusual. It then held that the proviso
of the death penalty statutes which gave the jury the option of returning a verdict of guilty without capital punishment was unconstitutional,.
but that the provision was severable so that the statutes survived

5/
as mandatory death penalty statutes.
The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 followed
the court's lead in enacting a new version of N.C. Gen. Stat.

§

14-

17 which was essentially unchanged from the prior version except
in making the death penalty mandatory. Section 14-17 now reads
as follows:
"Murder in the first and second degree defined;
punishment. -- A murder which shall be perpetrated
by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other
felony shall be deemed to be murder in the first degTee
and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree
and shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
two years nor more than life imprisonment in the
State's prison."
It was under this statute that the petitioners, who committed

their crime on June 3, 1974, were tried, convicted, and sentenced
to death.

'

.

75-5491, Woodscm
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II

The petitioners argue that the imposition of the death penalty
under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject this argument for the reasons stated today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp.

III

North Carolina, unlike Florida, Georgia, and Texas, has
responded to the Furman cases by making death the mandatory

__§_/
sentence for all persons convicted of first degree murder.

In

ruling on the constitutionality of the sentences imposed on the petitioners under the North Carolina statute, the Court now addresses
for the first time the question whether a death sentence returned
pursuant to a statute imposing a mandatory death penalty for a

7/
broad category of homicidal offenses- constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth
~/
Amendments.
The issue, lik.e that explored in Furman, involves
the procedure employed by the state to select persons for the unique

9/
and irreversible penalty of death.-

75-5491,

VVoods~
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A.
s.,

The Eighth Amendment .e~att8s i8 assure that the State's
1\

power to punish is "exercised within the limits of civilized society."
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). See
id., at 1 01; VVeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378 (191 0);
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468-469 (1947)
10/
(Frankfurter, J., concurring);Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 269-270 (Brennaq J., concurring);
_id., at329 (Marshall, J., concurring); id., at382-383 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id., at 408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id., at
428-429 (Powell, J., dissenting). Central to the application of the
Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards regarding
the infliction of punishment.

~ Important

indicia of societal values
11 I
identified in prior opinions include jury determinations,
legis121
13 I
lative enactments,- traditional usage,- and other measure141
ments of public opinion.

~~ factors,
·~

In order to provide a frame for the assessment of these
we may begin by sketching the history of mandatory death

penalty statutes in the United States. At the time the Eighth Amend-

~~ent was adopted in 1791,
~ .'Y

,(. .

the States uniformly followed the common

75-5491, WoodsOTI
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law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence
15 I
for certain specified offenses.- Although the range of capital offenses in the American colonies was quite limited in comparison to
the more than 200 offenses then punishable by death in England,
the colonies at the time of the Revolution imposed death sentences
on all persons convicted of any of a considerable number of crimes,
typically including at a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson,
161
rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy.-- As at common law, all
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified, or excused
17 I
constituted murder and were automatically punished by death.
Almost from the outset jurors reacted unfavorably to the harshness
18 I
of mandatory death sentences.- The States initially responded
to this expression of public dissatisfaction with mandatory statutes
by limiting the classes of capit<1;l offenses. Ohio, in 1788, was the
first jurisdiction to restrict the death penalty to persons convicted
of murder.

~I

The Ohio reform, however, left unresolved the problem posed
by the not infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers rather
than subject them to automatic death sentences. In 1794, Pennsylvania attempted to alleviate the undue severity of the law by confining

75-5491, Woodsr·

-
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the mandatory death penalty to "murder of the first degree" encompassing all "willful, deliberate and premeditated" killings. Pa. Laws
20/
1794 c. 1777.
Other jurisdictions, including Virginia and Ohio,
soon enacted similar measures, and within a generation the practice
21/
spread to most of the states.
Despite the broad acceptance of the division of murder into
degrees, the reform proved to be an unsatisfactory means of identifying persons appropriately punishable by death. Although its failure
was due in part to the amorphous nature of the controlling concepts
22/
of willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation,
a more fundamental weakness of the reform soon became apparent. Juries continued
to find the death penalty inappropriate in a significant number of
first degree murder cases and refused to return guilty verdicts for
23 I

that crime.
The inadequacy of distinguishing between murders solely on
the basis of legislative criteria narrowing the definition of the capital
offense led the states to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital
cases. Tennessee in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in 1846, were the first states to abandon mandatory death sen24/
tences in favor of discretionary death penalty statues.- The procedure enabled the juries to consider both the circumstances surrounding the particular crime and the character of the defendant in determining ·

·.c

'

.-

75-5491, Woodson
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whether to impose the death penalty in a given case. This flexibility
remedied the harshness of mandatory statutes by permitting the jury
to respond to mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty.
By the turn of the century, 23 states and the federal government
had made death sentences discretionary for first degree murder
and other capital offenses. During the next two decades 14 additional
states replaced their mandatory death penalty statutes. ~Y
the end of World War I, all but eight states, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia had either adopted discretionary death penalty schemes
or abolished the death penalty altogether. By 1963, all of these
remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty
~/
statutes with discretionary jury sentencing.
The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United
States thus reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons

-

convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh
and unworkably rigid. The two crucial indicators of evolving standards
of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society -jury determinations and legislative enactments -- both point conclusively to the repudiation of automatic death sentences. At least since
the Revolution, American jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded

' '

75-5491, Wood:
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their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a
death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict.
As we have seen, the initial movement to reduce the number of
capital offenses and to separate murder into degrees was prompted
in part by the reaction of jurors as well as by reformers who objected
to the imposition of death as the penalty for any crime. Nineteenth
century journalists, statesmen, and jurists repeatedly observed
that jurors were often deterred from convicting palpably guilty men
~I
of first degree murder under mandatory statutes.
Thereafter,
continuing evidence of jury reluctance to convict persons of capital
offenses in mandatory death penalty jurisdictions resulted in legislative authorization of discretionary jury sentencing -- by Congress
27 I

28 I

for federal crimes in 1897,- by North Carolina in 1949,291
by Congress for the District...of Columbia in 1962.

and

As we have noted today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante at __ ,
legislative measures adopted. by the people's chosen representatives
weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency.
The consistent course charted by the state legislatures and by
Congress since the middle of the past century demonstrates that the aversion of jurors for mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by

_lQ/
society at large.

75-5491, Woodst:-.
- 12 Still further evidence of the incompatibility of mandatory
death penalties with contemporary values is provided by the results
of jury sentencing under discretionary statutes. In Wither spoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court observed that "one of the
most important functions any jury can perform" in exercising its
discretion to choose "between life imprisonment and capital punishment" is "to maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system." Id., at 519 and n. 15. Various studies indicate that even in first degree murder cases juries with sentencing
discretion do not impose the death penalty "with any great frequency."
31/
H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury 436 (1966).The actions of sentencing juries suggest that under contemporary
standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment
for a substantial portion of convicted first degree murderers.
Although the Court has never ruled on the constitutionality
of mandatory death penalty statutes, on several occasions dating
back to 1899 it has commented upon our society's aversion to automatic death sentences. In Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 3 03
(1899 ), the Court noted that the "hardship of punishing with death
every crime coming within the definition of murder at common law,

75-5491, Woodstm
- 13 -

and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a capital conviction have
induced American legislatures, in modern times, to allow some
32/
cases of murder to be punished by imprisonment instead of by death."Fifty years after Winston, the Court underscored the marked transformation in our attitudes towards mandatory sentences: "The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls
for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habit s
of a particular offender. This whole country has traveled far from
the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions . . . . " Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949).
More recently, the Court in McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971 ), detailed the evolution of discretionary imposition
of death sentences in this country, prompted by what it termed the
American "rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." Id., at 198.
See id., at 198-202. Perhaps the one important factor about evolving
social values regarding capital punishment upon which the members
of the Furmal1 _S:;ourt agreed was the accuracy of McGautha' s assessment of our nation's rejection of mandatory death sentences. See

•,(..

75-5491, Woodsl- 14-

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id., at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 339 (Marshall,
J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (Burger, C.J., with whom Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, J. J., joined, dissenting); id., at 413
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Blackmun, for example,
emphasized that legislation requiring an automatic death sentence
for specified crimes would be "regressive and of an antique mold"
and would mark a return to a "point in our criminology [passed
beyond] long ago." Id., at 413. The Chief Justice, speaking for the
four dissenting justices in Furman, discussed the question of mandatory death sentences at some length:
"I had thought that nothing was clearer in history, as we
noted in McGautha one year ago, than the American abhorrence of 'the common-law rule imposing a mandatory
death sentence on all convicted murderers.' 402 U.S.,
at 198. As the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall
shows, ante, at 339, the 19th century movement away
from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened
introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process. It
r ecognized that individual culpability is not always
measured by the category of the crime committed. This
change in sentencing practice was greeted by the Court as
a humanizing development. See Winston v. United States,
172 U.S. 3 03 (1899 ); cf. Calton v. Utah, 13 0 U.S. 83 (1889).
See also Andres v. Ulill:ed States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)." 408 U.S., at 402.

75-5491, Woods._
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Although it seems beyond dispute that, at the time of the
Furman decision in 1972, mandatory death penalty statutes had been
renounced by American juries and legislatures, there remains the
question whether the mandatory statutes adopted by North Carolina
and a number of other states following Furman evince a sudden reversal of societal values regarding the imposition of capital punishment. In view of the persistent and unswerving legislative rejection
of mandatory death penalty statutes beginning in 1838 and continuing
33 I
for more than 130 years until Furman,
it seems evident that
the post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by the States to retain
the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution, rather
34/

than a renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing.
The fact that some states have adopted mandatory measures following
Furma~

while others have legislated standards to guide jury

discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court's
multi-opinioned decision in that case.
A brief examination of the background of the current North
Carolina statute serves to reaffirm our assessment of its limited
utility as an indicator of contemporary values regarding mandatory
death sentences. Before 1949, North Carolina imposed a mandatory

......

75-5491, Woodson
- 16death sentence on any person convicted of rape or first degree murder.
That year, a study commission created by the state legislature
recommended that juries be granted discretion to recommend life
sentences in all capital cases:
"We propose that a recommendation of mercy by the jury
in a capital case automatically carry with it a life sentence.
Only three other states now have the mandatory death penalty
and we believe that its retention will be definitely harmful.
Quite frequently juries refuse to convict for rape or first
degree murder because, from all the circumstances, they
do not believe the defendant, although guilty, should suffer
death. The result is that verdicts are returned hardly in
harmony with evidence. Our proposal is already in effect
in respect to the crimes of burglary and arson. There is
much testimony that it has proved beneficial in such cases.
We think the law can now be broadened to include all
capital crimes."
Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement of the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration of Justice in
North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949).
The 1949 session of the General Assembly of North Carolina
adopted the proposed modifications of its rape and murder statutes.
Although in subsequent years numerous bills were introduced in the
legislature to further limit or abolish the death penalty in North
Carolina, they were rejected as were two 1969 proposals to return
to mandatory death sentences for all capital offenses. See State v.

.

'-
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Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 441, 194 S.E. 2d 19, 26 (opinion of the
Court); 282 N.C., at 456-457, 194 S. E. 2d at 3 2-33 (Bobbitt, C. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Soon after this Court's decision in Furman, the North
Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the State ' s
death penalty statutes and concluded that Furman required the
severance of the 1949 proviso authorizing jury discretion but that
"the remainder of the statute with death as the mandatory punishment .
remains in full force and effect." State v. Waddell, 282 N.C.,
at444-445, 194S.E.2d, at

. In1974, theNorthCarolinalegis-

lature followed the course previously found constitutional in Waddell
and enacted a first degree murder provision identical to the mandatory statute in operation prior to the authorization of jury discretion.
The State's brief in this case i·elates that the legislature sought to
remove "all sentencing discretion [so that] there would be no successful Furman based attack upon the North Carolina statute."
It is now well established that the E ;ghth Amendment draws

much of its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U. S., at 101 (plurality opinion). As the above discussion makes
clear, one of the most significant developments in our society's

,¢ .,

._;
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- 18 treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the common
law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every
person convicted of a specified offense. North Carolina's mandatory
death penalty statute for first degree murder departs markedly from
contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the unique
and irretrievable punishment of death and thus cannot be applied
consistently with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State's power topunish "be exercised within the limits
of civilized society." Id., at 100.

B.
A separate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory death
sentence statute is its failure to provide a constitutionally tolerable
response to Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the
imposition of capital sentences. Central to the limited holding in
Furman was the conviction that the vesting of standardless sentencing power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 309-310 (Stewart,
J., concurring) id., at 313 (VVhite, J., concurring); E.

J~.,

at

253-257 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also.!:_<!_., at 398-399
(Burger, C. J., dissenting). It is argued that North Carolina has

75-5491, VVoodson
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remedied the inadequacies of the death penalty statutes held unconstitutional in Furman by withdrawing all sentencing discretion from
juries in capital cases. But when one considers the long and consistent American experience with the death penalty in first degree
murder cases, it becomes evident that mandatory statutes enacted
in response to Furman have simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion.
As we have noted in Part III-A, supra, there is general
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to conviet a significant portion of first degree murderers under mandatory
death penalty statutes. A North Carolina study commission reported
in 1949 that juries in that state "[q]uite frequently" were deterred
from rendering guilty verdicts for first degree murder because of
the enormity of the sentence automatically imposed. Moreover, as
a matter of historic fact, juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have consistently returned death sentences in only a
35 I
minority of first degree murder cases.-- In view of the historic
record, it is only reasonable to assume that juries will continue to
conclude that a substantial number of murderers should not receive
death sentences and will be motivated to disregard their oaths and

..
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exercise their power of nullification. North Carolina's mandatory
death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury in its
inevitable exercise of the power to determine which murderers shall
live and which shall die. And there is no way under the North Carolina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise
36/
of that power through a review of death sentences.- Instead of
rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may
well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the
penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act
lawlessly. While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably
be expected to increase the number of persons sentenced to death,
it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement of replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide,
regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing
a sentence of death.

c.
A third constitutional shortcoming of the North Carolina
statute is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death. In
Furman, members of the Court acknowledged what cannot fairly be

75-5491, Wood8\,or1
- 21 denied -- that death is a punishment different from all other sanctions
in kind rather than degree. See 408 U.S., at 286-291 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id., at 3 06 (Stewart, J., concurring). A process that
accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
This Court has previously recognized that "[f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of
more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed
and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 46, 51 (1937). Consideration of
both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and
appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing
development. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-249

,e.,

(1949); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 402-403 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy
rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 100 (plurality opinion),
requires that consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
be a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death sentences
imposed upon the petitioners under North Carolina's mandatory death
sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
37 I
The judgment of the North
and therefore must be set aside.
Carolina Supreme Court is reversed insofar as it upheld the death
sentences imposed upon the petitioners, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered .
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FOOTNOTES

This charge arose from the wounding of the customer.

2/
-

Tucker was allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory

after the fact to murder and to armed robbery. He was senteneed
to 10 years imprisonment on the first charge, and to not less than
20 nor more than 30 on the second. The sentences are to run concurrently.

3/
-

The Solicitor gave no reason for refusing to accept

Waxton' s offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. However, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in finding that the Solicitor did
not abuse his discretion, noted:
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed the
robbery and that he fired the shots which killed Mrs.
Butler and wounded Mr. Stancil is overwhelming.
No extenuating circumstances gave the solicitor any
incentive to accept the plea he tendered at the close
of the State's evidence.

****
"Finally, we note that Vvaxton and Woodson were adults,
aged 24 and 23 respectively; Tucker and Carroll were
still in their teens, aged 18 and 19 respectively." State
v. Woodson and Waxton, 287 N.C. 578, 595-596; 215 S.E.
2d 607,
{1975).
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-

The murder statute in effect in North Carolina until

1973 read as follows:
"§ 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined;
punishment. -- A murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with
death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment
shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the
court shall so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than two nor
more than thirty years in the State's prison." N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-17 (1969 repl. volume).

5/
-The Court characterized the effect of the statute without
the defective sections as follows:
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of any such offense,
the court must impose a sentence of death. The punishment
to be imposed for these capital felonies is no longer a discretionary question for the jury and therefore no longer a
proper subject for an instruction by the judge." 282 N.C.
at 445.

6/
-See N.C. Gen. Stat.

§

14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1974), set

forth in Part I supra. North Carolina has also enacted a mandatory
death sentence statute for the crime of first degree rape. N.C. Gen.
Stat.

§

14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1974).

FN-3
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This case does not involve a mandatory death penalty
statute limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide, such
as murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence, defined in large
part in terms of the character or record of the offender. We thus
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of such a statute.
See note 25 infra.

8/
-

The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and

unusual punishment has been held to be applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California,
370

u.s.

660 (1962).
The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238 (1972), involved statutes providing for jury discretion in the
imposition of death sentences, Several members of the Court in
Furman expressly declined to state their views regarding the constitutionality of mandatory death sentence statutes. See id., at 257
(Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 3 07 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id., at 310-311 (White, J., concurring).

!}

The petitioners here, as in the other four death penalty

cases before the Court, principally contend that their sentences were
imposed in violation of the Constitution because North Carolina has

,,
.•

-- --,
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failed to eliminate discretion from all phases of its procedure for
imposing capital punishment. We have rejected similar claims today
in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. In addition to these issues, however,
the mandatory nature of the North Carolina death penalty statute for
first degree murder presents further questions not emphasized by
the petitioners.

_!_Q_/
Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. He believed, however, that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself "expresses a demand for civilized
standards." Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.,
at 468 (concurring opinion).

11/
-See Witherspoon_v. Illino~, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n. 15
(1968);

McGau~ha

v. California, · 402 U.S. 183, 201-202 (1971); Furman

v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 3 00 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at
388 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id_., at 439-441 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Any attempt to discern, therefore, where prevailing standards of
decency lie must take careful account of the jury's response to the
question of capital punishment."):
The actions of jurors faced with the actual decision whether
or not to authorize the infliction of a specified punishment provides
perhaps the most reliable measure of our society's attitude toward
the imposition of the punishment.

FN-6
--.,_1 itv

opinion)

FN-s
J., concurring).

_!11
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 361 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (public opinion polls); id., at 385-386 (Burger,
C .J., dissenting) (public opinion polls); id., at 438-439 (Powell,
J ., dissenting) (referenda). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391

u. s.

510, 520 (1968).
15
-

I
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 28-29

(rev. ed. 1967).
16 I
See id., at 6; R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United
States 1-3 (1919) (Most New England colonies made 12 offenses
capital. Rhode Island, with !0 capital crimes, was the "mildest
of all of the colonies."); Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital
Punishment, 284 Annals of the Amer. Academy 8, 10 (1952) (''The
English colonies in this county had from ten to eighteen capital offenses. ") .

•~

I

-
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17 I
-

See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra,

at 23-24.

181
See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion
in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 (1953); Mackey,
The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,
54B.U.L. Rev. 32(1974); McGauthav. California, 402U.S. 183,
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S.
3 03' 31 0 (18 9 9) .
19
-

I
SeeR. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States,

supra, at 5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the
Great Law of William Penn limited capital punishment to murder
in 1682. Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania
greatly expanded the number of capital offe\ses. See Hartung, Trends
in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10.
Many States during the early 19th century significantly reduced the number of crimes punishable by death. See Davis, The
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861,
63 Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 & n. 15 (1957) (the author provides
later dates for the reform in Ohio).
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See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra,

at 23-24.

181
See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion
in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 (1953); Mackey,
The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,
54 B.U.L. Rev. 32 (1974); McGauthav. California, 402 U.S. 183,
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S.
3 03' 31 0 (18 9 9) .
19
-

I
SeeR. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States,

supra, at 5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the
Great Law of William Penn limited capital punishment to murder
in 1682. Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania
greatly expanded the number of capital offe\ses. See Hartung, Trends
in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10.
Many States during the early 19th century significantly reduced the number of crimes punishable by death. See Davis, The
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861,
63 Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 & n. 15 (1957) (the author provides
later dates for the reform in Ohio).
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-

See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra,

at 24.
21/
-

See ibid.; Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital

Punishment in America, 1787-1861, supra, at 26-27 n. 13. By the
late 1950s, some 34 states had adopted the Pennsylvania formulation,
and only 10 states retained a single category of murder as defined
at, common law. See Model Penal Code

§

201. 6, Comment 2, p.

66 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
22/
-

See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-199

(1971).
23 I
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra,
at 27; Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An
Historical Note, supra; McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199
(1971).
24/
See Tenn. Laws 1837-1838, c. 29; Ala. Laws 1841;
La. Laws 1846, c. 139. See also W. Bowers, Executions in
America, supra, at 7.

75-5491, Woodsm1
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Prior to the Tennessee reform in 1838, Maryland had changed
from a mandatory to an optional death sentence for the crimes of
treason, rape, and arson. Md. Laws 1809, ch. 138. For a time
during the early colonial period Massachusetts, as part of its
Capitan Lawes of 1636, had a nonmandatory provision for the crime
of rape. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty, supra, at 28.
25/
-

See W. Bowers, Executions in America 7-9 (1974)

(Table 1-2 sets forth the date each state adopted discretionary jury
sentencing); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in McGautha
v. California, No. 70-203, App. C (listing the state statutes in force
in 1970 providing for discretionary jury sentencing in capital murder
cases).
Prior to this Court's 19'72 decision in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, there remained a handful of obscure statutes scattered
among the penal codes of various states that required an automatic
death sentence upon conviction of a specified offense. These statutes
applied to such esoteric crimes as trainwrecking resulting in death,
perjury in a capital case resulting in the execution of an innocent
person, and treason against a state government. See H. Bedau,
The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 46-47 (1964 compilation).
The most prevalent of these statutes dealt with the crime of treason

.:.

·.
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against state governments. See id., at 47. It appears that no one
has ever been prosecuted under these or other state treason laws.
See Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at
10. See also T. Sellin, The Death Penalty: A Report for the Model
Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 1 (1959) (discussing
the Michigan statute, subsequently repealed in 1963, and the North
Dakota statute).

Several States retained mandatory death sentences

for perjury in capital cases resulting in the execution of an innocent
person. Data covering the years from 1930 to 1961 indicate, however, that no State employed its capital perjury statute during that
period. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at
46.
The only category of mandatory death sentence statute that
appears to have had any relev:ance to the actual administration of
the death penalty in the years preceeding Furman concerned the
crimes of murder or assault with a deadly weapon by a life term
prisoner. Statutes of this type apparently existed in 5 states in 1964.
See id., at 46-47. In 1970, only 5 of the more than 550 prisoners
under death sentence across the country had been sentenced under
a mandatory death penalty statute. Those prisoners had all been
convicted under the California statute applicable to assaults by life
term prisoners. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in McGautha
v. California, No. 70-203, at 15 n. 19. We have no occasion in this

Wood ~ .

75-5491,
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case to examine the constitutionality of mandatory death sentence
statutes applicable to prisoners serving life sentences.
26/
-

See Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punish-

ment: An Historical Note, supra.
27 I
-See H.R. Rep. No. 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896)
(The report noted that the modification of the federal capital statutes
to make the death penalty discretionary was in harmony with "a growing public sentiment." Id., at 2, quoting H.R. No. 545, 53d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1894) ); S. Rep. No. 846, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. (1895 ).
28/
-

See Report of the Special Commission for the Improve-

ment of the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration
of Justice in North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949).
29/
~
- . See Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary
of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia 19-20 (May 17,
1961) (testimony of Senator Keating). Data compiled by a former
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia indicated that
juries convicted defendants of first degree murder in only 12 of the

75-5491, Woodson
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60 jury trials for first degree murder held in the District
of Columbia between July 1, 1953 and February, 1960. Id., at 19 .
The conviction rate was "substantially below the general average
in prosecuting other crimes." Id., at 20. The lower conviction
rate was attributed to the reluctance of jurors to impose the harsh
consequences of a first degree murder conviction in cases where the
record might justify a lesser punishment. Ibid. See McCafferty,
Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 1 Crim. L .Q. 9,
14-15 (1963) (discussing a similar study of first degree murder
cases in the District of Columbia during the period July 1, 1947,
through June 30, 1958).
A study of the death penalty submitted to the American Law
Institute noted that juries in Massachusetts and Connecticut had
"for many years" resorted to second degree murder convictions
to avoid ihe consequences of those states' mandatory death penalty
~ ~~~ sla:kdcs

statutes for first degree murder, prior to the~replacement with
1\

discretionary sentencing in 1951. See T. Sellin, The Death Penalty:
A Report to the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law
Institute 13 (1959).

75-5491, Woodstn1
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A 1973 Pennsylvania legislative report surveying the available literature analyzing mandatory and discretionary death sentence statutes concluded:
"Although the data collection techniques in some instances are weak, the uniformity of the conclusions in
substantiating what these authors' termed 'jury nullification' (i.e. refusal to convict because of the required
penalty) is impressive. Authors on both sides of the
capital punishment debate reached essentially the same
conclusions. Authors writing about the mandatory death
penalty who wrote in 1892 reached the same conclusions
as persons writing in the 1950's and 1960's."
McCloskey, A Review of the Literature Contrasting Mandatory and
Discretionary Systems of Sentencing Capital Cases, Pa. GSCCP
Report No. 2, published in Report of the Governor's Study Commission
on Capital Punishment 101 (Sept. 1973).
30/
-

Not only have ll!_andatory death sentence laws for murder

been abandoned by legislature after legislature since Tennessee replaced its mandatory statute 138 years ago, but, with a single exception, no State prior to this Court's Furman decision in 1972 ever
returned to a mandatory scheme after adopting discretionary sentencing.
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 3 0; W.
Bowers, Executions in America, supra, at 9. Vermont, which first
provided for jury discretion in 1911, was apparently prompted to

75-5491, Woodf '
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return to mandatory sentencing by a "veritable crime wavp of twenty
murders" in 1912. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America,
supra, at 30. Vermont reinstituted discretionary jury sentencing
in 1957.
31/
- - Data compiled on discretionary jury sentencing of
persons convicted of capital murder reveal that the penalty of death
is generally imposed in less than 20% of the cases. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386-387 n. 11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id., at 435-436 n. 19 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brief for the
Petitioner in Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027, at App. F
(collecting data from a number of jurisdictions indicating that the
percentage of death sentences in many states was well below 2{'%).
Statistics compiled by the Department of Justice show that only 66
convicted murderers were sentenced to death in 1972. See Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, Capital Punishment, 19711972 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin Dec. 1974) (Table 7a).

_g/

Later, in Andres v. United States, Justice Frankfurter

observed that the 19th century movement leading to the passage of
legislation providing for discretionary sentencing in capital cases

-
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"was impelled both by ethical and humanitarian arguments ag-ainst
capital punishment, as well as by the practical consideration that
jurors were reluctant to bring in verdicts which inevitably called
for its infliction." 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (concurring opinion).
See note 3 0, supra.
34

I

- A study of public opinion polls on the death penalty

concluded that "despite the increasing approval for the death penalty
reflected in opinion polls during the last decade, there is evidence
that many people supporting the general idea of capital punishment
want its administration to depend on the circumstances of the case,
the character of the defendant, or both." Vidmar and Ellsworth,
Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245, 1267
(1974). One poll discussed by the authors revealed that a "substantial
majority" of persons opposed mandatory capital punishment. Id., at
1253. Moreover, the public through the jury system has in recent
years applied the death penalty in anything but a mandatory fashion.
See note 31, supra.
35/
-

See note 31 supra.
3~

u.s.

See Gregg v. Georgia,
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Our determination that the death sentences in this

case were imposed under procedures that violated constitutional
standards makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether imposition of the death penalty on petitioner Woodson would have been
so disporportionate in comparison to the nature of his involvement
in the capital offense as indep endently to violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, _ _ U.S.
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.

I.
The difficulties which attend the plurality•s explanation
for the result it reaches tend at first to obscure difficulties
at least as significant which inhere in the unarticulated
premises which necessarily underlie that explanation.

I

advert to the latter only briefly, in order to devote the
major and following portion of this dissent to those issues
which the plurality actually considers.
As an original proposition, it is by no means clear
that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
embodied in the Eighth Amendment, and made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v.
California, 370

u.s.

660

(1962) was not limited to those

punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.
402

u.s.

183, 225

(1971)

McGautha v. California,

(Black, J. concurring).

If

-

Weems v. United States, 217

2 -

u.s.

349 (1910), dealing not

with the Eighth Amendment but with an identical provision
contained in the Philippine Constitution, and the plurality
opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356

u.s.

86 (1958), are to be

taken as indicating the contrary, they should surely be
weighed against statements in cases such as Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99

u.s.

130 (1879); In re Kernrnler, 136

u.s.

(1890); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329

436

u.s.

459, 464 (1947); and the plurality opinion in Trop itself,
that the infliction of capital punishment is not in itself
violative of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
Thus for the plurality to begin its analysis with the
assumption that it need only demonstrate that "evolving
standards of

dec~ncy"

show that contemporary "society" has

rejected such provisions is itself a somewhat shaky point
of departure.

But even if the assumption be conceded, the

plurality opinion's analysis nonetheless founders.
The plurality relies first upon its conclusion that
society has turned away from the mandatory imposition of
death sentences, and second upon its conclusion that the
North Carolina system has "simply papered over" the problem
of unbridled jury discretion which two of the separate

-

3 -

opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408

u.s.

238 (1972)

identified

as the basis for the judgment rendering the death sentences
there reviewed unconstitutional.

The third "constitutional

shortcoming" of the North Carolina statute is said to be
"its failure to allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of the sentence
of death."

Ante at 20.

I do not believe that any one of these reasons singly,
nor all of them together, can withstand careful analysis.
Contrary to the plurality's assertions they would import
into the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause procedural
requirements which find no support in our cases.

Their

application will result in the invalidation of a death
sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of first degree
murder under the North Carolina system, and the upholding
of the same sentence imposed on an identical defendant
convicted on identical evidence of first degree murder
under the Florida, Georgia, and Texas discretionary system
a result surely as "freakish" as that condemneu in the
separate opinions in Furman.

...

..
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II.

The plurality is simply mistaken in its assertion that
"[t]he history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the
United States thus reveals that

the practice of sentencing

to death all persons convicted of a parti:c ular offense have
been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid."
at 10.

Ante,

This conclusion is purportedly based on two historic

developments: the first a series of legislative decisions
during the nineteenth century narrowing the class of offenses
punishable by death; the second a series of legislative
decisions during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
through which mandatory imposition of the death penalt y
I

largely gave way to jury discretion in deciding whether
or not to impose this ultimate sanction.

The first

development may have some relevance to the plurality's
argument in general but has no bearing at all upon this
case.

The second development, properly analyzed, has

virtually no relevance even to the plurality's argument.
There can be no question that the legislative and
other materials discussed in the plurality's opinion show
a widespread conclusion on the part of. state legislatures
during the nineteenth century that the penalty of death

-

5 -

was being required for too broad a range of crimes, and
that these legislatures proceeded to narrow the range of
crimes for which such penalty could be imposed.

If this

case involved the imposition of the death penalty for an
offense such as burglary or sodomy, see ante, at 8, the
virtually unanimous trend in the legislatures of the
States to exclude such offenders from liability for
capital punishment might bear on the Court•s Eighth Amendment argument.

But petitioners were convicted of first

degree murder, and there is not the slightest suggestion
in the material relied upon by the court that there had
been any turning away at all, much less any such unanimous
turning away, from the death penalty as a punishment for
those guilty of first degree murder.

The legislative

narrowing of the spectrum of capital crimes, therefore,
while very arguably representing a general societal
judgment since the trend was so widespread, simply never
reached far enough to exclude the sort of aggravated
homicide of which petitioners stand convicted.
The second string to the plurality•s analytical bow
is that legislative change from mandatory to discretionary
imposition of the death sentence likewise evidences societal

- 6 rejection of mandatory death penalties.

The plurality simply

does not make out this part of its case, however, in large
part because it treats as being of equal dignity with
legislative judgments the judgments of particular juries and
of individual jurors.
There was undoubted dissatisfaction, from more than one
sector of nineteenth century society, with the operation of
mandatory death sentences.

One segment of that society was

totally opposed to capital punishment, and was apparently
willing to accept the substitution of discretionary
imposition of that penalty for its mandatory imposition
as a halfway house on the road to total abolition.

Another

segment was equally unhappy with the operation of the
mandatory system, but for an entirely different reason.
As the plurality recognizes, this second segment of society
was unhappy with the operation of the mandatory system, not
because of the death sentences imposed under it, but because
people obviously guilty of criminal offenses were not
being convicted under it.

See ante, at 11.

Change to a

discretionary system was accepted by these persons not
because they thought mandatory imposition of the death
penalty was cruel and unusual, but because they thought
that if jurors were permitted to return a sentence other

- 7 than death upon the conviction of a capital crime, fewer
guilty defendants would
supra, 402

u.s.,

be acquitted.

See McGautha,

at 199.

So far as the action of juries is concerned, the fact
that in some cases juries operating under the mandatory
system refused to convict obviously guilty defendants does
not reflect any "turning away" from the death penalty, or
the mandatory death penalty, supporting the proposition
that it is "cruel and unusual".

Given the requirement of

unanimity with respect to jury verdicts in capital cases,
a requirement which prevails today in States which accept
a non-unanimous verdict in the case of other crimes, see
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363-364 (1972), it is
apparent that a single juror could prevent a jury from
returning a verdict of conviction.

Occasional refusals to

convict, therefore, may just as easily have represented the
intransigence

of only a small minority of twelve jurors as

well as the unanimous judgment of all twelve.

The fact that

the presence of such jurors could prevent conviction in a
given case, even though the majority of society, speaking
through the legislature, had decreed that it should be
imposed, certainly does not indicate that society as a whole
rejected mandatory punishment for such offenders; it does

- 8 -

not even indicate that those few members of society who
serve on juries, as a whole, had done so.
The introduction of discretionary sentencing likewise
creates no inference that contemporary society had rejected
the mandatory system as unduLy

No ~b

- - ----- ·- . .

~ ~gislatures

se~:re.~

enacting discretionary sentencing statutes

had no reason to think that there would not be roughly the
same number of capital convictions under the new system as
under the old.

The same subjective juror responses which

resulted in juror nullification under the old system were
legitimized, but in the absence of those subjective
responses to a particular set of facts, a capital sentence
could as likely be anticipated under the discretionary
system as under the mandatory.

And at least some of those

who would have been acquitted under the mandatory system
would be subjected to at least some punishment under the
discretionary system, rather than escaping altogether a
penalty for the crime of which they were guilty.

That

society was unwilling to accept the paradox presented to
it by the actions of some maverick juries or jurors -the acquittal of palpably guilty defendants -- hardly
reflects the sort of an "evolving standard of decency"
to which the plurality professes obeisance.

-

9 -

Nor do the opinions in Furman which indicate a preference
for discretionary sentencing in capital cases suggest in the
slightest that a mandatory sentencing procedure would be
cruel and unusual.

The plurality concedes, as they must,

that following Furman

ten

states enacted laws providing

for mandatory capital punishment.

See State Capital

Punishment Statutes Enacted Subsequent to Furman v. Georgia,
Congressional Research Service Pamphlet 17-22 (June 19, 1974).
These enactments the plurality seeks to explain as due to a
wrong-headed reading of the holding in Furman.
explanation simply does not wash.

But this

While those States may

be presumed to have preferred their prior systems reposing
sentencing discretion in juries or judges, they indi5putably
preferred mandatory capital punishment to no capital
punishment at all.

Their willingness to enact statutes

providing that penalty is utterly inconsistent with the
notion that they regarded mandatory capital sentencing as
beyond "evolving standards of decency."

The plurality's

glib rejection of these legislative decisions as having
little weight on the scale which it finds

in U.e Eighth

Amendment seems to me more an instance of their desire
to save the people from themselves than a

conscientious

effort to ascertain the content of any "evolving standard
of decency."

- 10 III.
The second constitutional flaw which the plurality
in North Carolina's mandatory system is that it has simply
"papered over" the problem of unchecked jury discretion.
The plurality states that, ante, at 19, "there is general
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to
convict a significant portion of first degree murderers
under mandatory death penalty statutes.
states,

~,

The plurality also

at 19, that "as a matter of historic fact,

juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority of
first degree murder cases."

The basic factual assumption

of the plurality seems to be that for any given number of
first degree murder defendants subject to capital punishment,
there will be a certain number of jurors who will be unwilling
to impose the death penalty even though they are entirely
satisfied that the necessary elements of the substantive
offense are made out.
For purposes of argument, I am willing to accept the
plurality's hypothesis:

but it seems to me impossible to

conclude from it that a mandatory death sentence statute
such as North Carolina enacted is any less sound consti-

.

tutionality than are the discretionary standards enacted

- 11 by Texas, Florida, and Georgia which the Court upholds.
For if the hypothesis is true as to the existence of
jurors having a bent towards

nullificat~on

in a mandatory

death penalty Stete such as North Carolina, there is no
reason whatever to believe that like numbers of jurors so
inclined do not exist also in Georgia, Florida, and Texas.
This class of jurors, wherever they reside, will because
of their own subjective responses to some aspect of the
case presented to them simply decline to impose the death
penalty even though all the stated standards for the
imposition of that penalty have, in their judgment, been
met.
In North Carolina these jurors may simply hang a jury
or they may impose their will sufficiently so that a verdict
of not guilty is brought in;

in Louisiana they will have a

similar effect in causing some juries to bring in a verdict
of guilty of a lesser included offense even though all the
jurors are satisfied that the elements of the greater
offense are made out.

Such jurors, of course are violating

their oath, but such violation is not only consistent with
the majority's hypothesis, the majority 1 s hypothesis is
bottomed on its occurrence.

- 12 But what will be the effect of the presence of these
jurors on juries in Florida, Georgia, and Texas 3 States
which have a so-called "discretionary" system of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances for determining whether or not
to impose the death penalty?

In those states, these

hypothetical "maverick" jurors will just as surely respond
to their peculiar notions of when capital punishment should
not be imposed aa will their counterparts in North Carolina
and Louisiana.

Even though convinced that circumstances

specified by the legislature are present in a particular case,
if they nonetheless choose not to impose the death penalty
in that case, they will decline to find those circumstances
present.

The result is just as surely a form of jury nul-

lification in the discretionary States as it would be in
the mandatory States.

Only if the legislature has, by

enacting a list of generalizations entitled aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, anticipated precisely the foibles
of these particular jurors, will there be no jury nullification in the discretionary States.

And if that be the

result, the legislative effort to specify "aggr;J,vating" and
"mitigating" circumstances proves to be much ado about
nothing.

It amounts simply to meaningless advance

ratification by the legislature of exercises by juries of
subjective notions as to how mercy should be dispensed.

- 13 The plurality opinion must rest therefore upon the
unstated assumption that jurors and courts will somehow
be guided by legislatively enacted discretionary standards,
but will not be guided by legislatively enacted mandatory
standards.

That the plurality does not expressly embrace

such a dubious assumption is quite understandable because
no reliable empirical evidence is available to support i t.
In my view there will undoubtedly be elements of juror
nullification present in any given number of a class of
capital cases; thAre will certainly be no more under a
mandatory system than under a discretionary system unless
the latter is frankly structured so as to ratify in
advance the subjective notions of jurors which would
otherwise lead to juror nullification.
The plurality seems to believe, see ante at 20, that
provision for appellate review will afford a check upon
the instances of juror nullification in a discretionary
system.

But it is not at all apparent that appellate

review of death sentences, through a process of comparing
the facts of one case in which a death sentence was imposed
with the facts of another in which such a sentence was
imposed, will afford any meaningful protection against
whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion.

All

- 14 that such review of death sentences can provide is a
comparison of fact situations which must in their nature
be highly particularized if not unique, and the only
relief which it can afford is to single out the occasional
death sentence which in the view of the reviewing court
does not conform to the standards established by the
legislature.

Appellate review affords no correction

whatever with respect to those fortunate few who are the
beneficiaries of random discretion exercised by juries,
whether under an admittedly discretionary system or under
a purportedly mandatory system.

It may make corrections

at one end of the spectrum, but cannot at the other.

It

is even less clear that any provision of the Constitut ion
can be read to require such appellate review.

If the

States wish to undertake such an effort, they a r e undoubtedly
free to do so, but surely it is not required by the United
States Constitution.
The Court's insistence on "standards" to "guide the
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to decide
which murderer shall live and which shall die" is squarely
contrary to the Court's opinion in McGautha, supra,
authored by Mr. Justice Harlan and subscribed to by five
other members of the court only five years ago.

So is the

- 15 court's latter-day recognition, some four years after the
decision of the case, that Furman requires "objective
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."
Its abandonment of stare decisis in this repudiation of
McGautha is a far lesser mistake than its substitution of
a superficial and contrived constitutional doctrine for
the genuine wisdom contained in McGautha.

There the court

addressed the "standardless discretion" contention in this
language:
C·{In our view, such force as this argument has derives
largely from its generality. Those who have come to
grips with the hard task of actually attempting to draft
means of channeling capital !Sentencing discretion have
confirmed the lesson taught by the history recounted
above. To identify before the fact those characteristics
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call
for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.
Thus the British Home Office, which before the recent
abolition of capital punishment in thst country had the
responsibility for Selecting the cases from England and
Wales which should receive the benefit of the Royal
Prerogative of Mercy, observed:
-IJ-The difficulty of defining by sny statutory provision the types of murder whieh ought or ought
not to be punished by death IDBY be illustrated by
reference to the many diverse coll5iderations to .which
the Home Secretary has regard in deciding whether
to recommend clemency. No simple formula can take
account of the innumerable deg:-ees of culpability,
and no formula which fails to do so can claim to
be just or satisfy public opinion."'1-2 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence 13 '(1949). 11 402 u.s., at 204-205.

*

*

*
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\'Jn light of history, experience, and the pre'*:nt lim~ta
tions of human knowledge, we find it quite. rmp~ssible
to say that committing to the untrammeled d1s~retw~ of
the jury the power to pronounce life or d~at~ m capital
cases is offensive to anything in the ConstitutiOn. The
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by
the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel.
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors
in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the
scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would
ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases
and facets to each case. would make general standards
either meaningless ~oiler-plate' ot ..a... statement otf ;l'~e,_ 208
.
.
obvious
t h at no JUry
would need .,.,,;oq. U:l u.S. , a
'
(citation omitted).
It is also worth noting that the plurality opinion
repudiates not only the view expressed by the court in
McGautha, but also, as noted in McGautha, the view which
had been adhered to by every other American jurisdiction
which had considered the question.

n.

See 402

u.s.

at 196

a.
IV.

The plurality opinion's insistence, in Part III c,
that if the death penalty is to be imposed there must be
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant" is
buttressed by neither case authority nor reason.

Its

principal claim to distinction is that it contradicts
important parts of Part III A in the same opinion •

. .,

- 17 Part III A, which describes what it conceives to have
been society's turning away from the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty, purports to express no opinion as to the
constitutionality of a mandatory statute for "an extremely
narrow category of homicide, such as murder by a prisoner
serving a life sentence."

See ante at

n. 7.

Yet if

"particularized consideration" is to be required in every
case under the doctrine expressed in Part III

c,

such a

reservation in Part III A is disingenous at best.
The requirl3ment of "particularized consideration" in
Part III C is, if consistent analysis still be thought
relevant to doctrinal soundness, also fatally at odds with
the major premise of Part III B of the plurality's opinion.
Part III B denounces mandatory sentencing statutes b e cause,
so the opinion says, the prevalence of juror nullification
means that in practice even under mandatory statutes there
will be subjective discretion exercised by jurors.
III

c,

Part

on the other hand, proceeds to denounce mandatory

sentences because in theory, if not in practice, the jurors
are not allowed to exercise any discretion in deciding
whether the sentence should be imposed once they have
determined that the defendant committed the offense in
question.

- 18 None of the cases half-heartedly cited by the plurality
in Part III c comes within a light year of establishing the
proposition that individualized consideration is a constitutional requisite for the imposition of the death penalty.
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302

u.s.

51 (1937), upheld against a

claim of violation of the Equal Protection Clause a
Pennsylvania statute which made the sentence imposed upon
a convict breaking out of a penitentiary dependent upon the
length of the term which he was serving at the time of the
break.

In support of its conclusion that Pennsylvania had

not denied the convict equal protection, the court observed:
"The comparative gravity of criminal
offenses and whether their consequences
are more or less injurious are matters
for [the State•s] determination • • • •
It may inflict a deserved penalty merely
to vindicate the law or to deter or to
reform the offender or for all of these
purposes. For the determination of sentences,
justice generally requires consideration of
more than the particular acts by which the
crime was committed and that there be taken
into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities
of the offender. His past may be taken to
indicate his present purposes and tendencies
and significantly to suggest the period of
restraint and the kind of disciplinb that
ought to be imposed upon him."
302 u.s., at

55.
These words of Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for the
court in that case, and those of Mr. Justice Black in
Williams v. New York, 337

u.s.

241 (1949), the other opinion

- 19 relied on by the plurality, lend no support whatever to
the principle that the constitution requires individualized
consideration.

This is not surprising, since even if such

a doctrine had respectable support, which it has not, it is
unlikely that either Mr. Justice Butler or Mr. Justice Black
would have embraced it.
The plurality also relies upon the indisputable proposition that

11

death is different .. for the result which it

reaches in Part III c.
11

But the respects in which death is

different 11 from other punishment which may be imposed upon

convicted criminals do not seem to me to establish the
proposition that the Constitution requires individualized
sentencing.
One of the principal reasons why death is different
is because it is irreversible; an executed defendant
cannot be brought back to life.

This aspect of the

difference between death and other penalties would undoubtedly support statutory provisions for especially
careful review of the fairness of the trial, the accuracy
of the fact-finding process, and the fairness of the
sentencing procedure where the death penalty is imposed.
But none of those aspects of the death sentence is at issue
here.

Petitioners were found guilty of the crime of first

I,;OV

- -- - - -

degree murder in a trial the constitutional validity of
which is unquestioned here.

And since the punishment of

death is conceded by the plurality not to be a cruel and
unusual punishment for such a crime, the irreversible
aspect of the death penalty has no connection whatever
with any requirement for individualized consideration of
the sentence.
The second aspect of the death penalty which makes it
"different" from other penalties is the fact that it is
indeed an ultimate penalty, which ends a human life rather
than simply requiring that a living human being be confined
for a given period of time in a penal institution.

This

aspect of the difference may enter into the decision of
whether or not it is a "cruel and unusual" penalty for a
given offense.

But since in this case the offense was

first degree murder, that particular inquiry need proceed
no further.
The plurality's insistence on individualized consideration of the sentencing, therefore, depends not upon any
traditional application of the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment.
The punishment here is concededly not cruel and unusual,
and that determination has traditionally ended judicial

-

.<::.l.

-

inquiry in our cases construing the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.

Trop v. Dulles, supra; Robinson v.

California, supra; Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber,
supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra.

What the plurality

opinion has actually done ib to import into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be
desirable procedural guarantees where the punishment of
death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime o f
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed.

This

is squarely contrary to McGautha, and unsupported by any
other decision of this court.
I agree with the conclusion of the plurality, and with
that of Mr. Justice White, that death is not a cruel and
unusual punishment for the offense of which these petitioners
were convicted.

Since no member of the Court suggests that

the trial which led to those convictions in any way fell
short of the standards mandated by the Constitution, the
judgments of conviction should be affirmed.

The Fourteenth

Amendment, giving the fullest scope to its "majestic
generalities," Fay v. New York, 332

u.s.

261, 282 (1947),

is conscripted rather than interpreted when used to permit
one but not another system for imposition of the death
penalty.

(Woodson, cont'd
6/28/76)
- 10-

III.

The second constitutional flaw which the plurality finds
in North Carolina's mandatory system is that it has simply
"papered over" the problem of unchecked jury discretion.
The plurality states that, ante, at 19, "there is general
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to
convict a significant portion of first degree murderers
under mandatory death penalty statutes.

The plurality also

states, ante, at 19, that "as a matter of historic fact,
juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority of
first degree murder cases."

The basic factual assumption

. of the plurality seems to be that for any given number o£
first degree murder defendants subject to capital punishment,
there will be a certain number of jurors who will be unwilling
to impose the death penalty even though they are entirely
satisfied that the necessary elements of the substantive
offense are made out.

-

11 -

In North Carolina jurors unwilling to impose the death
penalty may simply hang a jury or they may so assert th e mselves that a verdict of not guilty is brought in; in Louisiana
they will have a similar effect in causing some juries to bring
in a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense even though
all the jurors are satisfied that the elements of the greater
offense are made out.

Such jurors, of course)are violating

their oath, but such violation is not only consistent with
the majority's hypothesis: the majority's hypothesis is
bottomed on its occurrence.
For purposes of argument, I accept the plurality's
hypothesis:

but it seems to me impossible to conclude

from it that a mandatory death sentence statute such as
North Carolina enacted is any less sound constitutionally
than are the systems enacted by Georgia, Florida, and Texas
which the Court upholds.
In Georgia

juries are entitled to return a

sentence of life, rather . than death, for no reason whatever,
simply based upon their own subjective notions of what is
right and what is wrong.

In Florida the judge and jury are

required to weigh legislatively enacted aggravating factors

- 12 against legislatively enacted mitigating factors, and then base
their choice between life or death on an estimate of the
result of that weighing.

Substantial discretion exists here,

too, though it is somewhat more canalized than it is in Georgia.
Why these types of discretion are regarded by the plurality
as constitutionally permissible, while that which may occur
in the North Carolina system is not, is not readily apparent.
The freakish and arbitrary nature of the death penalty
described in the separate opinions of Stewart, J., and
I

White, J., in Furman arose not from the perception
that so many capital sentences were being imposed:, but from
the perception that so few were being imposed.

To conclude

fuat the North Carolina system is bad because juror nullification may permit jury discretion while concluding that the
Georgia and Florida systems are sound because they reguire
this same discretion, is, as the plurality opinion demonstrates,
inexplicable.
The Texas system much more closely approximates the
mandatory North Carolina system which is struck down today.

- 13 -

The jury is required to answer three statutory questions.

If

the questions are unanimously answered in the affirmative,
the death penalty must be imposed.

It is extremely difficult

to see how this system can be any less subject to the infirmities
caused by juror nullification which the plurality concludes are
fatal to North Carolina's statute.

The plurality apparently

thinks it can sidestep this inconsistency because of its
belief that one of the three questions will permit consideration of mitigating factors justifying imposition of a life
~ntence.

It is, however, as the plurality recognizes, Jurek

v. Texas, ante, at 8-9, far from clear that the statute is to
be read in such a fashion.

In any event, while the imposition

of such unlimited consideration of mitigating factors may
conform to the plurality's novel constitutional doctrine
that

."[a]

jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of

all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should
be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed," id., at
7-8.

the resulting system seems as likely as any to produce

the unbridled discretion which was condemned by the separate
opinions in Furman.

- 14 The plurality seems to believe, see ante, at 20, that
provision for appellate review will afford a check upon
the instances of juror arbitrariness in a discretionary
system.

But it is not at all apparent that appellate

review of death sentences, through a process of comparing
the facts of one case in which a death sentence was impos e d
with the facts of another in which such a sentence was
imposed, will afford any meaningful protection against
whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion.

All

that such review of death sentences can provide is a
comparison of fact situations which must in their nature
be highly particularized if not unique, and tfe only
relief which it can afford is to single out the occasional
death sentence which in the view of the reviewing court
does not conform to the standards established by the
legislature.
It is established, of course, that there is no right
to appellate review of a criminal sentence.
153

u.s.

684 (1894).

McKane v. Durston,

That question is not at issue here,

since North Carolina, along with the other four States whose
systems the petitioners are challenging in these cases,
provides appellate review for a death sentence imposed in
one of its trial courts.

- 15 By definition, of course, there can be no separate
appellate review of the factual basis for the sentencing
decision in a mandatory system.

If it is once established

in a fairly conducted trial that the defendant has in fact

committed the crime in question, the only question as to the
rentence which can be raised on appeal is whether a
legislative determination that such a crime should be
punished by death violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Here both petitioners were

convicted of first degree murder, and there is no
serious question raised by the plurality that death is not
a constitutionally permissible penalty for such a crime.
But the plurality sees another role for appellate review
in its description of the reasons why the Georgia, Texas,
and Florida systems are upheld, and the North Carolina system
stricken down.

And it is doubtless true that Georgia in

particular has made a substantial effort to respond to the
concerns expressed in Furman, not an easy task considering
the glossolalia! manner in which those concerns were
expressed.

The Georgia Supreme Court has[indicated that the

Georgia death penalty statute requires it to review death
sentences imposed by juries on the basis of rough "proportionality".

It has announced that it will not sustain, at

..

- 16 least at the present time, death penalties imposed for armed
robbery because that penalty is so seldom imposed by juries
fur that offense.

It has also indicated that it will not

sustain death penalties imposed for rape in certain fact
situations, because the death penalty has been so seldom
imposed on facts similar to those situations.
But while the Georgia response may be an admirable one
as a matter of policy, it has imperfections, if a failure
to conform completely to the dictates of the separate
opinions in Furman be deemed imperfections, which the
plurality opinion does not point out.

Although there may

be some disagreement between the plurality opinion, and
the opinion of my Brother White in Gregg v. Georgia, which
I have joined, as to whether the proportionality review
conducted by the Supreme Court of Georgia is based solely
~on

capital sentences imposed, or upon all sentences imposed

in cases where a capital sentence could have been imposed
by law, I shall assume for the purposes of this discussion

- 17 that the system contemplates the latter.

But this is

still far from a guarantee of any equality in sentencing,
and is lik ewise no guarantee against juror nullification.
Under the Ge orgia system, this jury is free to recommend life
imprisonment, as opposed to death, for no stated reason
W1atever.

The Georgia Supreme Court cannot know, therefore,

when it is reviewing jury sentences for life in capital
cases, whether the jurors found aggravating circumstances
present, but nonetheless decided to recommend mercy, or
mstead found no aggravating circumstances at all ' and opted
for mercy.

So the "proportionality" type of review, while

it would perhaps achi e ve its obj ec tive if there were no
possible factual lacunae in the jury verdicts, will not
achieve its objective because there are necessarily such
lacunae.
Identical defects seem inherent in the systems of
appellate review provided in Texas and Florida, for neither
requires t he sentencing authority which concludes that a
death penalty is inappropriate to state what mitigating
factors were found to be present or whether certain
aggravating factors urged by the prosecutor were actually
found to be lacking.

Without such detailed factual

- 18 findings the plurality's praise of appellate review as a
cure for the constitutional infirmities which it identifies
seems to me somewhat forced.
Appellate review affords no correction
whatever with respect to those fortunate f ew who are t he
beneficiaries of random discretion exercised by juries,
whether under an admittedly discretionary system or under
a purportedly mandatory system.

It may make corrections

at one end of the spectrum, but cannot at the other.

It

is even less clear that any provision of the Constitution
can be read to require such appellate review.

If the

States wish to undertake such an effort, they are undoubted l y
free to do so, but surely it is not required by the United
States Constitution.
The Court's insistence on "standards" to "guide the
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to decide
which murderer shall live and which shall die " is squarely
contrary to the Court's opinion in McGautha, supra,
authored by Mr. Justice Harlan and subscribed to by five
other members of the Court only five years ago.

/

So is the

decision of the case, that Furman requires "objective
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."
Its abandonment of stare decisis in this repudiation of
McGautha is a far lesser mistake than its substitution of
a superficial and contrived constitutional doctrine for
the genuine wisdom contained in McGautha.

There the Court

addressed the "standardless discretion" contention in this
language:

Clin

our view, such force as this argument has derives
largely from its generality. Those who have come to '
grips with the hard task of actually attempting to draft
means of channeling capital ~entencing discretion have
confirmed the lesson taught by the history recounted
above. To identify before the fact those characteristics
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call
for the death penalty, and to express tbese characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.
Thus the British Home Office, which before the recent
abolition of capital punishment in tbst country had the
responsibility for selecting the cases from England and
Wales which should receive the benefit of the Royal
Prerogative of Mercy, observed:
...fJ-The difficulty of defining by :my statutory provision the types of murder which ought or ought
not to be punished by death m.sy be illustrated by
reference to the many diverse cofu-.iderations to which
the Home Secretary has regard in deciding whether
to recommend clemency. No simple formula can take
account of the innumerable deg:-ees of culpability,
and no formula which fails to do so can claim to
be just or satisfy public opinion.~1-2 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence 13 (1949).-' 402 u.s., at 204-205.

*

*

*
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tions of human knowledge, we find it quite .tmpo.sstble
to say that committing to the untrammeled dts~retw~ of
the jury the power to pronounce life or d~ath. m capital
The
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fellow human will ad with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by
the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel.
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors
in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the
scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would
ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases
and facets to each case. would make general standards
either meaningless tfboiler-plate1) OJ: ..A... statement Of the_ _ OS
.
.
ld
d "'l'l u :L u. s • , a t 2 -o 1 2
obvwus that no JUry wou nee .
·
(citation omitted).

It is also worth noting that the plurality opinion
repudiates not only the view expressed by the Court in
McGautha, but also, as noted in McGautha, the view which
had been adhered to by every other American jurisdiction
which had considered the question.

See 402

u.s.

at 196

n. 8.

IV.

The plurality opinion's insistence, in Part III C,
that if the death penalty is to be imposed there must be
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant" is
buttressed by neither case authority nor reason.

Its

principal claim to distinction is that it contradicts
important parts of Part III A in the same opinion.

been society's turning away from the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty, purports to express no opinion as to the
constitutionality of a mandatory statute for "an extreme ly
narrow category of homicide, such as murder by a prisone r
serving a life sentence."

See ante at

n. 7.

Yet if

"particularized consideration" is to be required in every
case under the doctrine expressed in Part III C, such a
reservation in Part III A is disingenous at best.
The

requir~ment

of "particularized consideration" in

Part III C is, if consistent analysis still be thought
relevant to doctrinal soundness, also fatally at odds with
the major premise of Part III B of the plurality's opinion.
Part III B denounces mandatory sentencing statutes be:.•cause,
so the opinion says, the prevalence of juror nullification
means that in practice even under mandatory statutes there
will be subjective discretion exercised by jurors.

Part

III C, on the other hand, proceeds to denounce mandatory
sentences because in theory,

if not in practice, the jurors

are not allowed to exercise any discretion in deciding
whether the sentence should be imposed once they have
determined that the defendant committed the offense in
question.

ny

~fie

plurality

in Part III C comes within a light year of estublishing the
proposition that individualized consideration is a constitutional requisite for the imposition of the death penalty.
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937}, upheld against a
claim of violation of the Equal Protection Clause a
Pennsylvania statute which made the sentence imposed upon
a convict breaking out of a penitentiary dependent upon the
length of the term which he was serving at the time of the
break.

In support of its conclusion that Pennsylvania had

not denied the convict equal protection, the court observed:
The comparative gravity of criminal
offenses and whether their consequences
are more or less injurious are matters
for [the State's] determination • • • •
It may inflict a deserved penalty merely
to vindicate the law or to deter or to
reform the offender or for all of these
purposes. For the determination of sentences,
justice generally requires consideration of
more than the particular acts by which the
crime was committed and that there be taken
into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities
of the offender. His past may be taken to
indicate his present purposes and tendencies
and significantly to suggest the period of
restraint and the kind of disciplint that
ought to be imposed upon him...
302 u.s., at
11

55.
These words of Mr. Justice

~utler,

speaking for the

Court in that case, and those of Mr. Justice Black in
Williams v. New York, 337

u.s.

241 (1949), the other opinion

ne

:J.:uTCt :1: -cy,

:~:ena

no supp-or

the principle that the Constitution requires individualized
consideration.

This is not surprising, since even if such

a doctrine had respectable support, which it has not,

it is

unlikely that either Mr. Justice Butler or Mr. Justice Black
would have embraced it.
The plurality also relies upon the indisputable proposition that "death is different" for the result which it
reaches in Part III

c.

But the respects in which death is

"different" from other punishment which may be imposed upon
convicted criminals do not seem to me to establish the
proposition that the Constitution requires individualized
sentencing.
One of the principal reasons why death is different
is because it is

irreversible~

cannot be brought back to life.

an executed defendant
This aspect of the

difference between death and other penalties would undoubtedly support statutory provisions for especially
careful review of the fairness of the trial, the accuracy
of the fact-finding process, and the fairness cf the
sentencing procedure where the death penalty is imposed.
But none of those aspects of the death sentence is at issue
here.

Petitioners were found guilty of the crime of first

which is unquestioned here.

And since the punishment of

death is conceded by the plurality not to be a cruel and
unusual punishment for such a crime, the irreversible
aspect of the death penalty has no connection whatever
with any requirement for individualized consideration of
the sentence.
The second aspect of the death penalty which makes it
"different" from other penalties is the fact that it is
indeed an ultimate penalty, which ends a human life rather
than simply requiring that a living human being be confined
for a given period of time in a penal institution.

This

aspect of the difference may enter into the decision of
whether or not it is a "cruel and unusual" penalty for a
given offense.

But since in this case the offense was

first degree murder, that particular inquiry need proceed
no further.
The plurality's insistence on individualized consideration of the sentencing, therefore, depends not upon any
traditional application of the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment.
The punishment here is concededly not cruel and unusual,
and that determination has traditionally ended judicial

.....

Punishment Clause.

Trop v. Dulles, supra: Robinson v.

California, supra: Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber,
supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra.

What the plurality

opinion has actually done ib to import into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be
desirable procedural guarantees where the punishment of
death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime of
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed.

This

is squarely contrary to McGautha, and unsupported by any
other decision of this court.
I agree with the conclusion of the plurality', and with
that of Mr. Justice White, that death is not a cruel and
unusual punishment for the offense of which these petitioners
were convicted.

Since no member of the court suggests that

the trial which led to those convictions in any way fell
short of the standards mandated by the constitution, the
judgments of conviction should be affirmed.

The Fourteenth

Amendment, giving the fullest scope to its "majestic
generalities," Fay v. New York, 332

u.s.

261, :>82 (1947),

is conscripted rather than interpreted when used to permit
one but not another system for imposition of the death
penalty.
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75-5491

James ~yron~ Wooqso~
and Luby W axton,
On Writ of Certiorari to th~
Peti tionefl?,
Supreme Court of North:
Carolina. v,
Sta~ of North QIU'olina.
[June -

1

1976]

delivered an op1n1on
MR, JusTICE S~wART, :MR. JusTICE P<?WELL, and MR1
and announced the
JusTICE STEVENS
judgment of the
Court.
The question in this case is whether the imposition o~
a death sentence for the crime of first-degree murder under the law of North Carolina violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
I
The petitioners were convicted of first-degree murder
as the result of their participation in an armed robbery
~ a convenience food store, in the course of which the
~
cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded.
There were four participants in the robbery: the petitioners Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton and two
others, Leonard Tucker and Johnnie Lee Carroll. At
the petitioners' trial Tucker and Carroll testified for the
prosecution after having been permitted to plead guilty
to lesser offenses; the petitioners testified in their own
defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that the
four men had been discussing a possible robbery for
some time. On the fatal day Woodson had been drinking heavily. .-\bout 9.30 p.m., Waxton and Tucker came

•,-
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to the trailer where Woodson was staying. When
Woodson came out of the trailer, Waxton struck him
'!'£·a·c·~~~i:o;:n-nth::-.;e:-:~ and threatened to kill him in an effort to
~ ~;J make him sober up and come along on the robbery . . The
three proceeded to Waxton's trailer where they met Carroll. Waxton armed himself with a nickel-plated derringer; and Tucker handed Woodson a rifle. The four
then set out by automobile to rob the store. Upon arriving at their destination Tucker and Waxton g t ?
sf Mn em •••11' went into the store while Carroll and
""'~
Woodson remained in the car • ' · 1 as lookouts. Once
inside the store, Tucker purchased a package of cig._
arettes from the woman cashier. Waxton then als~
asked for a package of IIi F~~·,u rsnt as tHe cashier (!igarette!)
approached him he pulled the derringer out of his hip
pocket and fatally shot her at point~ blank range. Waxton then took the money tray from the c-ash register and
·gave it to Tucker, who carried it out of the store, pushing past an entering customer as he reached the door.
After he was outside, Tucker heard a second shot from
inside the store, and shortly thereaft~r W axton emerged,
carrying a handful of paper money. Tucker and Waxtoil got in the car and the four drove away.
The petitioners' testimony agreed in large part with
this version of the circumstances of the robbery. It differed diametrically in one important respect: Waxton
claimed e
had a gun, and that Tucker had shot
both the cashier and the customer.
During the trial Waxton asked to be allowed to plead
guilty to the same lesser offenses to which Tucker had
pleaded guilty,' but the solicitor refused to accept the

1-

J.Tucker had been allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory
after the fact to murder and to armed robbery. He was sentenced
io 10 'l'ars imprisonment on tlw first: eha.r e and to not less
,......,....,_,_-~t~IH~tn~:W~nor mort> than 30 on the Hecon , t 1e sen ences o run
wucurl't'ntly.

~ars)
-

~
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pleas.2 Woodson, by contrast, maintained throughout
the trial that he had been coerced by Waxton, that he
was therefore innocent, and that he would not consider
pleading guilty to any offense.
The petitioners were found guilty on all charges, 3 and,
as was required by 'statute, sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court o
Carolina
med. State v.
Woodson, 215 S. E. 2d 607 287 N. C. 57~ 1975). We
granted certiorari,- U.S.-, to consider whether the
imposition of the death penalties in this case comports
with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
II
The petitioners argue that the · imposition of the death
penalty under any circumstances is· cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. We reject this argument for the reasons
stated today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp.

·

•/3• '(!:"t- 30)

III
At the time of this Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), North Carolina law pro2

The solicitor gave no reason for refusing to accept. Waxtori's
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
Supreme
Court of North Carolina, in finding that the so icitor had not
abused his discretion, noted:
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed the robbery and
that he fired the shots which killed Mrs. Butler and wounded
Mr. Stancil is overwhelming. No extenuating circumstances gave
the solicitor any incentive to accept the plea he tendered at the
close of the State's evidence." 287 N. C. 578, 595-596; 215 S. E.
2d 607,
(1975).
3 In ad i ion to first-degree murder, both petitioners were found
guilty of armed robbery. Waxton was also found guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, a charge arising from the
wounding of the customer.

~---~~··
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vided that in cases of first-degree murder, the jury in its
unbridled discretion could choose whether the convicted
defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.4 Mter the Furman decision the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in State v. Waddell, 282 N. C.
431, 194 S. E. 2d 19 (1973), held unconstitutional the
provision of the death penalty statute that gave the jury
the option of returning a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, but held further that this provision was
severable so that the statute survived as a mandatory
death penalty law.G
The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 followed the court's lead and enacted a new statute that
was essentially unchanged from the old one except that
• The murder statute in effect in North Ca~olia until 1973 read
as follows:
('§ 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison,
lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated , killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to
be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death:
Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the
jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.
All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second
degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than
two nor more than thirty years in the State's prison." N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-17 (1969 rep!. volume).
6 The Court characterized the effect of the statute without the
invalid provision as follows:
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of any such offense, the
,-------...~co~u~r~m;u~s~l~l In: a sentence of death. The punishment to be impronounce posed for these~capital felonies is no longer a discretionary question for the jury and therefore no longer a proper subject for~
in&iruction by the judge." 282 N.C., at 445, 194 S. E. Zd, at-,:;:'" ~

\ t:
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it made the death penalty mandatory. The statute now
· reads as follows:
"Murder in the first and second degree defined;
punishment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated
by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, b~
glary or other felony shall be deemed to be ~ ~
in the first degree and shall be punished with death.
All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder
m the second egree and shall be unished by imfor a term
prisonment o not less than two years nor more
than life imprisonment in the Stat~'s ~~·· N. C~
Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1971\) . ~
It was under this statute that the petitioners, who
committed their crime on June 3, 1974, were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.
North Carolina, unlike Florida, Georgia, and Texas,
has thus responded to the Furman decision by making
death the mandatory sentence for all persons convicted
of first-degree murder." In ruling on the constitutionality of the sentences imposed on the petitioners under
this North Carolina statute, the Court now addresses for
the first time the question whether a death sentence returned pursuant to a law imposing a mandatory death
penalty for a broad category of homicidal offenses 7 con~North

Carolina also has enacted a mandatory death sentence
of first-degree rape. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-21

~me

~

. '.....

t~u_!!~-,~UIJP :

l:''I'J.·

This case does not involve a mandatory death penalty statute
limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide, such as murder
by a prisoner serving a life sentence, defined in large part in terms of
7
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stitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 The
issue, like that explored in Furman, involves the procedure employed by the State to select persons for the
unique and irreversible penalty of death. 9

A
The Eighth Amendment stands to assure that the
State's power to punish is "exercised within the limits
"of civ1f1zed .... Dq: ." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurtiity opinion). See id., at 101; Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378 (1910); Louisiana
·ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468-469 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); 10 Robinson v. California,
the character or record of the offender. We thus express no opinion
regarding the constitutionality of such a statute. See n. 25, infra.
8 The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment has been held to be applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U. S.

660(1962).

Cj

The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
involved statutes providing for 'urv discr · n ·n the im o · ·
death sentences. Several ;(embers of the Court in Furman expressly dec:;lined to state tl:ie1r views regarding the constitutionality
of mandatory death sentence statutes. See id., at 257 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id., at 307 (STEWART, J., concurring); id., at 310-311
(WHITE, J ., concurring).
8 The petitioners here, as in the other four death penalty cases before the Court, contend that their sentences were imposed in violation of the Constitution because North Carolina has failed to eliminate discretion from all phases of its procedure for imposing capital
punishment. We have rejected similar claims today in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. The mandatory nature of the North Carolina death
penalty statute for first-degree murder presents a different. question under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
1.o Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that the Eighth Amendment
did not apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. He
believed, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

• ,f
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370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 269-270
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 329 (MARSHALL, J.,
concurring); id., at 382-383 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting);
id., at 40J (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); id., at 428--429
(PoWELL, J., dissenting). Central to the application of
the Amendment is a determination of contemporary
standards regarding the infliction of punish:_:;m:;_:e~n;.t·~;,:A~s-r.~-:-:::
discussed in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. mdicia
of societal values identified in prior opinions include
history and traditional usage/ 1 legislative enactments, 1 z
and jury determinationsY
In order to provide a frame for assessing the relevancy
of these factors in this case we begin by sketching the
history of mandatory death penalty statutes in : the
United States. At the time the Eighth Amendment was
adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death · the exclusive ! and

:? ,

Q'1-:;l..o

Amendment itself "expresses a demand for civilized standards."

· Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S., at 468 (concurring
opinion).
11 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S . at 99 (plurality opinion) (dictum).
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 291 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring) .
12 See Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 377 (1910) (noting
that the punishment of cadena temporal at issue in that case had "no
fellow in American legislation"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U, S. 238,
~~ (1972) (PoWELL, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, ante,
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 and n. 15 (1968);
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 201-202 (1971); Fur.
man v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 8I8ft!'
A lj I ~ c . &l; 'd ,_.
388 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); id., at 439-441 (PowELL, J., dis18

senting) ("Any attempt to discern, therefore, where prevailing
standards of decency lie must take careful account of the jury's response to the question of capital punishment.").

r
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mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses.14 Although the range of capital offenses in the American
colonies was quite limited in comparison to the more
than 200 offenses then punishable by death in England/ 5
the colonies at the time of the Revolution imposed
death sentences on all persons convicted of any of a
considerable number of crimes, typically including at
a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy. 16 As at common law, all
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified,
or excused constituted murder and were automatically
punished by death.17 Almost from the outset jurors
reacted unfavorably to the harshness of mandatory death
sentences.u The States initially responded to this expression of public dissatisfaction with mandatory statutes by limiting the classes of capital offenses." ~· ~

1if'

Ilia. · w a t

• r •t:._li!_,.:~JIJ: d

HSee H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in: America _.;;(rev. ed.
1967).
~
15 See id., at 1-2; R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States
1-2 (1919) .
16 See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 6;
Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, supra, at 2-3
ost New England colonies made 12 offenses capital. Rhode Island, with 10 capital crimes, was the "mildest of all of the colonies.") ; Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284
Annals of the Amer. Academy 8, 10 (1952) ("The English colonies
in this country had from ten to eighteen capital offenses.") .
11 See H. Bedau, Th~> Death Penalty in America, supra, at 23-24.
::18 See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099 , 1102 (1953) ; Mackey, The
Inutility of l'vlandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,
54 B. U . L. Rev . 32 (1974) ; McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183,
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United Stat es, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J ., concurring) ; Winston v. United States, 172 U. S.
303, 310 (1899).
19 See R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, supra, at
5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the Great Law

,;
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G-0~...---:'iili.iiiiJ•i.ITa, reform, however, left unresolved the prob~~
lem posed by the not infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers rather than subject them to automatic
death sentences. In 1794, Pennsylvania attempted to
alleviate the undue severity of the law by confining
the mandatory death penalty to "murder of the first
degree" encompassing all "willful, deliberate and premeditated'' killings. Pa. Laws 1794 c. 1777.2{) Other
jurisdictions, including Virginia and Ohio, soon enacted
similar measures, and within a generation the practice
spread to most of the States.n
Despite the broad acceptance of the division of murder into degrees, the reform proved to be an unsatisfactory means of identifying persons appropriately punishable by death. Although its failure was due in part to
the amorphous nature of the controlling concepts of willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditati.on,22 a more fundamental weakness of the reform soon became apparent.
Juries continued to find the death penalty inappropriate
in a significant number of first-degree "murder cases and
refused to return guilty verdicts for that crime.23
of William Penn limit ed capital punishment to murder in 168Z.
Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania greatly expanded the number of capital offenses. See Hartung, Trends in the
Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10.
Many States during the early 19th century significantly reduced
the number of crimes punishable by death . See Davis, The Move-ment to Abolish Capital Punishment in America , 1787- 1861, 63 ~
Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 and n. 15 (1957)
· -oc """'Ti-iili3 "ISL'~'i"" ~

d 'L fUll.

6

]!!'*"

i ili'U).

20

See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 24.
See ibid.; Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment
in America, 1787-1861 , supra, at 26-27 n. 13. By the late 1950s;.
some 34 States had adopted the Pennsylvania formulation , and only·
10 States retained a single category of murder as defined a~Torr
law. See Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 2, p . .
ent..
Draft No.9, 1959) .
22
See McGautha v. Cailfornia, 402 U. S. 183, 198-199 (1971).
t 3 See li. l3edau, The D~t th Pf)nalty in Ameri.ca, supra, at 27;;
21
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The inadequacy of distinguishing between murde~
solely on the basis of legislative criteria narrowing the
definition of the capital offense led the States to grant
juries sentencing discretion in capital cases. Tennessee
in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in
1846, were the first States to abandon mandatory -death
sentences in favor of discretionary death penalty statutes.24 This flexibility remedied the harshness of mandatory statutes by permitting the jury to respond to
mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty.
By the turn of the century, 23 Stat~ and the Federal \. ~
Government had made death senten~ discretionary for ~
first-degree murder and other capital offenses. During
the next two decades 14 additional States replaced their
mandatory death penalty statutes. Thus, by the end
of World War I, all but eight States.- Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia \&@)e1therkdopted discretionary
death penalty schemes or abolished the death penalty
altogether. By 1963, all of these remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty statutes with discretionary jury sentencing. 25
· The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in
Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, supra; McGautha v. California, supra, at 199 .
24 See Tenn. Laws 1837-1838, c. 29; Ala. Laws 184(;"~La--.~L-a~-,.::;---'
:
c. 139. See also W. Bowers, Executions ip. Arrte'f-ica..- ~

c.3J
(

19 74))

Prior to the Tennessee reform in 1838, Maryland had changed
from a mandatory to an optional death sentence for the crimes of
treason, rape, and· arson. Md. Laws 1809, c. 138. For a time
_....,...--------~ di.tring the early colonial period Massachusetts, as part. of its
C:~apitall Lawes'~
of 1636, had a nonmandatory provision for the
-~
crime of rape. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty, supra, at 28.
_
25
See W. Bowers, Executions in America PI 11 lit-( Table 1 2" ( , supra , at 7sets forth the date eaeh State adopted discretio&!ry jury sentenc- ~':...,;;;;;;;;:;;:,;__ _ __.
in · B · f for the United States as Amicus Curiae in McGautha v.
r;,;..---......-I-...~...
·a~li;f_o_rn"':"i...;a,-.N.,.o_7...0-_2_o"f_)A) . C
statutes in force

v

App. B (listing the statutes in each state initi~lly
introducing discretionary jury sentencing in cap~tal
cases),
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the United
tencing to
offense has
ably rigid.

11

States thus reveals that the practice of sendeath all persons convicted of a particular
been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkThe two crucial indicators of evolving stand-

in 1970 providing for discretionary jury sentencing in capital murder
cases).
Prior to this Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U. S. 238, there remained a handful of obscure statutes scattered
among the penal codes in variou.s States that required an automatic
death sentence upon conviction of a specilfied offense. These
statutes applied to such esoteric crimes as trainwrecking resulting in
death, perjury in a capital case resulting in the execution of an innocent person, and treason against a state government . See H.
Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 46-47 (1964 compilation). The most prevalent of these statutes dealt 'with the
crime of treason against state governments.
t ap- :C bl
pears that no one has ever been prosecuted . under these or other _ _ _ _ __,
state treason laws. See Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital
Punishment, supra, at 10. See also T . Sellin, The Death Penalty:
A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law
Institute 1 ( 1959) (discussing the Michigan · statute, subsequently
repealed in 1963, and the North Dakota statute). Several States
retained mandatory death sentences for perjury in capital cases resulting in the execution of an innocent. person. Data covering the
years from 1930 to 1961 indicate, however, that no State employed
its capital perjury statute during that period. See H. Bedau, The
Death Penalty in America, supra , at 46.
The only category of mandatory death sentence statute that ap- S
pears to have had any relevance to the actual administrat on of the
death penalty in the years preceeding Furman concerned the crimes
of murder or assault with a deadly weapon by a life-term prisoner.
Statutes of this type apparently existed in five States in 1964. See
id., at 46-47. In 1970, only five of the more than 550 prisoners
under death sentence across the country had been sentenced under
a mandatory death penalty statute. Those prisoners had all been
convicted under the California statute applicable to assaults by lifeterm prisoners. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in
McGautha v. California, No. 70-203, at 15 n. 19. We have no
occasion in this case to examine the constitutionality of mandatory
death sent<'ncc :;ta.tutes applica.ole to prisoners serving life sentences.

J.. ..

E.-@
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a.rds of decency respecting the imposition of puni~~
ment in our society-jury determinations and legislative
enactments-both point conclusively to the repudiation
of automatic death sentences. At least since the Revolution, American jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence
of a guilty verdict. As we have seen, the initial movement to reduce the number of capital offenses and , to
separate murder into degrees was prompted in part by
the reaction of jurors as well as by reformers who objected to the imposition of death as the penalty for
any crime. Nineteenth century journalists, statesmen,
and jurists repeatedly observed that . jurors were often
deterred from convicting palpably. guilty men of first. degree murder under mandatory statu~s. 26 . Thereafter,
continuing evidence of jury reluctance to convict persons
of capital offenses in mandatory death penalty jurisdiCtions resulted in legislative authorization of discretionary jury sentencing-by. Congress for federal crimes in
1897/7 by North Carolina in 1949,28 and by Congress for
the District of Columbia in 1962.2 9
26

See Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital }>unishment:
An Historical Note, supra.
.
27 See H. R. Rep . No . 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896) (The re~
port noted that the modification of the federal capital statutes to
make the death penalty discretionary was in harmony with "a
.. growing public sentiment." /d., at 2, quoting H. R.(No. 545, 53d {
Cong., 2d Sess.\.1 (1894)); S. Rep. No. 846, 53d COng., 3d Sess.
(1895).
28 See Report of the Special Commission for the Improvement of
the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration of Justice in North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949).
29 See Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary of the
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia 19- 20 (May 17, 1961)
(testimony of Sen. Keating) . Data eompiled by a former United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia indicated that furies . .

!

KQ. e. J
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As we have noted today in Gregg v. Georgia, •crlll~•"';;j[~?;;;~;p;:.'\'\'lfin~.\<\qqJ~\'\~0
.....,legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen
:.
representatives weigh heavily in ascert~tining contemporary standards of decency. The consistent course
charted by the state legislatures and by Congress since
·convicted defendants of first-degree murder in only 12 of the 60 jury
trials for first-degree murder held in the District of Columb111 bt>-twe~n July 1, 1953, and February 1960.
'
- e conv1etion rate was "substantially below the general · verage 111 pro~ecut.- _ _ _,_,__ _..
·ing other crimes." Jd., at 20. The lower conviction rat.t> was
attributed to the reluctance of jurors to impose the harsh con~equences of a first-degree murder conviction in cases where the record
might justify a lesser punishment. Ibid. See McCafferty, MaJor
Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 1 Crim. L. Q. 9, 14-15
(1963) (discussing a similar study of first-degree murder cases in
the District of Columbia during the period .Tuly 1, 1947, through
June 30, 1958).
A study of the death penalty submitted to rhe American Law Institute noted that juries in Massachusetts and Connecticut had "for
many years" resorted to second-degree murder conv1ctwns to avoid
the consequences of those States' mandatory $1eath penalty statutes
for first-degree murder , pnor to their replacement w1th discretionary
sentencing in 1951. Sec T . Srllin, The Death Penalty: A Report to
the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 13
(1959).
A 1973 Pennsylvania legislative report surveying the available
literature analyzing mandatory
death s<>ntence
statutes concluded:
"Although the data collection techniques in some instances are
weak, the uniformity of the conclusions m substantiating what theRe
authors' termed 'jury nullification' (i.e. refusal to convict because of
the required penalty) is impressive. Authors on both sides of the
capital punishment debate reached essentially the same conclusions.
Authors writing about the mandatory death penalty who wrote in
1892 reached the same conclusions as persons writing in tlw 1950'~·
and 1960's''
McCloskey, A Review of the Literature Contrasting 'Mandatory and
Disrretionary Systems of Sentencing Capital Cases, Pa. GSCCJ>Report No. 2, published in Heport of the Governor's Study Commission on Capital Puni~htnent 101 (Sept. 1973) .

Ui.(•

-' .
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the middle of the past century demonstrates that the

~--aversion of JUrors-. mandatory death penalty statutes

is shared by society lt large. 30
Still further evidence of the incompatibility of mandatory death penalties with contemporary values is provided by the results of jury sentencing under discretionary statutes. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510
( 1968), the Court observed that "one of the most important functions any jury can perform" in exercising its
discretion to choose "between life imprisonment and
capital punishment" is "to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system."
Id., at 519 and n. 15. Various studies indicate that even
in first-degree murder cases juries with sentencing discretion do not impose the death penalty "with any great
frequency." H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American
Jury 436 (1966). 31 The actions of sentencing juries sug80

Not only have mandatory death sentence laws for murder been
abandoned by legislature after legislature since Tennessee replaced
its mandatory statute 138 years ago, but, with a single exception, no
State prior to this Court's Furman decision in 1972 ever returned
to a mandatory scheme after adopting discretionary sentencing.
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 30; W.
Bowers, Executions in America, supra, at 9. Vermont, which first
provided for jury discretion in 1911, was apparently prompted to return to mandatory sentencing by a "veritable crime wave of twenty
murders" in 1912 . See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America,
supra, at 30. Vermont reinstituted discretionary jury sentencing in
1957.
81 Data compiled on discretionary jury sentencing of persons convicted of capital murder reveal that the penalty of death is generally imposed in less than 20% of the cases. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U . S. 238, 386-387, n. 11 (1972) (BuRGER, C. J ., dissenting); id., at 435-436 n. 19 (PowELL, J., dissenting); Brief for the
Petitioner in Aikens v. Cailfornia, No . 68--5027, at App . F (collecting data from a number of jurisdictions indicating that the percentage of death sentences in many States was well below 20%) .
Statistics compiled by the Department of Justice show that only
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gest that under contemporary standards of decency
death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a
substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers.
Although the Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of mandatory death penalty statutes, on several
occasions dating back to 1899 it has commented upon
our society's aversion to automatic death sentences. In
Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303 (1899), the
Court noted that the "hardship of punishing with death
every crime coming within the definition of murder at
common law, and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a
~capital convictio~have induced American legislatures, in
modern times, to allow some cases of murder to be un~ne(foyimpriSoilffie;~instead of by death." 32 Fiftf@.
years after Winston, the Court underscored tlie marked
transformation in our attitudes towards mandatory sen.l
tences: "The belief no longer prevails that every offense
in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits. of a particular
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the
period in which the death sentence was an automatic
and commonplace result of convictions .... " Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949).
f\fore recently, the Court in McGautha v. California,
402 U. S. 183 (1971), detailed the evolution of discretionary imposition of death sentences in this country,,

,:~at

310

J

~victed mui71~ were sentenced to death in 1972. See Law
Enforcement Assista'iice Administration, Capital Punishment, 19711972 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin Dec. 1974) (Table 7a)
(the figure does nc :
32
Later, in Andres v. United States, Justice Frankfurter observed include persons
that the 19th century movement leading to the passage of legisla- retained in loc a 1
tion providing for discretionary sentencing in capital cases "was im- facilities during
pelled both by ethical and humanitarian arguments against capital the pend ancy 0 f
punishment, as well as by the practical consideration that juroi'S'
h .
l )
were reluctant to bring in verdicts which inevitably called for its. __t_e_l._r_a
__~e~ -~ --·---....__.._ _ _ _ _ _iJ,',fliction." 333 U. S. 740, 753 (1948} (concurring opinio~

Gn

INSERT

~r--------------

Add to footnote 32 (at the end of the current footnote) - Insert 1

The Court in Andres noted that the decision of Congress at the end
of the 19th century to replace mandatory death sentences with discretionary jury sentencing for federal capital crimes was prompted
by "[d]issatisfaction over the harshness and antiquity of the federal
criminal laws." Id., at 747-748 n. 11.
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prompted by what it termed the American "rebellion
against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory
death sentence on all convicted murderers." /d., at 198.
See id., at 19~202. Perhaps the one important factor
about evolving social values regarding capital punishment upon which the members of the Furman Court
agreed was the accuracy of McGautha's assessment of
our Nation's rejection of mandatory death sentences.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. 8., at 245-246 (Douglas,
J., concurring); id., at 297-298 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 339 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id., at
402-403 (BuRGER, C. J., with whom BLACKMUN, PowELL,
and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, dissenting); id., at 413
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN,
for example, emphasized that legislation requiring an
automatic death sentence for specified . crimes would be
"regressive and of an antique mold" and would mark
a return to a "point in our criminology [passed beyond]
long ago." /d., at 413. THE CHIEF JusTICE, speaking
for the four dissenting justices in Furman, discussed the
question of mandatory death sentences at some length:
"I had thought that nothing was clearer in history,
as we noted in M cGautha one year ago, than the
American abhorrence of 'the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted
murderers.' 402 U. 8., at 198. As the concurring
opinion of Mt. J..J!sti~ MJ\.r.sh!lll shows, ante, at 339,
the 19th century move~ay from mandatory
death sentences marked an enlightened introduction
of flexibility into the sentencing process. It recognized that individual culpability is not always
measured by the category of the crime committed.
This change in sentencing practice was greeted by
the Court as a humanizing development. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303 (1899); ct
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Calton v. Utah, 130 U. S. 83 ( 1889). See also
Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 753 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)." 408 U. S., at 402.
Although it seems ~eyond dispute that, at the time of
the Furman decision in 1972, mandatory death penalty
statute"rs had been renounced by American juries and
legislatures, there remains the question whether the'
mandatory statutes adopted by North Carolina and a
number of other States following Furman evince a sudden reversal of societal values regarding the imposition
of capital punishment. In view of the persistent and·
unswerving legislative rejection of mandatory death penalty statutes beginning in 1838 and continuing for more
than 130 years until Furman, 33 it seems evident that the
post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by the States
to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the
Constitution, rather than a renewed societal acceptance
of mandatory death sentencing. 34 The fact that some
States have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others have legislated standards to guide jury
discretion ~P.P$.:.\.r...s, attributable to diverse read~'ngs
of
this Court's multibpinioned
decision
in
that
case.
35/
fl
'
A brief examination of the background of the current
North Carolina statute serves to reaffirm our assessment .

-

See n. 30, supra.
A study of public opinion polls on the death penalty concluded
that "despite the increasing approval for the death penalty reflected
in opinion polls during the last decade, there is evidence that many
people supporting the general idea of capital punishment want its
administration to depend on the circumstances of the case, thecharacter of the defendant, or both." Vidmar and Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245, 126T
(1974). One poll discussed by the authors revealed that a "substantial majority" of persons opposed mandatory capital punishment. !d., at 1253. l\Ioreover, the public through the jury system has in recent Years applied the death penalty in anything but
4"'"'"7~
a mnndatory fa slllQJ1
.. srr n.. 1, supra.
88

u

35/

Insert 2

Page

~new footnote

35 -- Insert 2

35 1
The fact that, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist 1 s dissent
properly notes, some States "preferred mandatory capital punishment to no capital punishment at all," post at p. 9, is entitled to
some weight. But such an artificial choice merely establishes a
desire for some form of capital punishment; it is hardly "utterly
inconsistent with the notion that [those states] regarded maridatory
capital sentencing as beyond 1 evolving standards of decency, 1

"

Ibid. It says no more about contemporary values than would the
decision of a State thinking itself faced with a choice between a barbarous punishment and no punishment at all to choose the former.
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of its limited utility as an indicator of contemporary
values regarding mandatory death sentences. Before
1949, North Carolina imposed a mandatory death sentence on any person convicted of rape or first-degree
murder. That year, a study commission created by the
state legislature recommended that juries be granted discretion to recommend life sentences in all capital cases:
"We propose that a recommendation of mercy b
the jury in t' capital case automa ICa y carry w1t
it a life sentence. Only three other states now
have the mandatory death penalty and we believe
that its retention will be definitely harmful. Quite
frequent~juries refuse to convict for rape or first
degree murder because, from all the circumstances,
they do not believe the defendant, although guilty,
should suffer death. The result is that verdicts are '
returned hardly in harmony with evidence. Our
proposal is already in effect in respect to the crimes
of burglary and arson. There is much testimony :
that it has proved beneficial in such cases. We
think the law can now be broadened to include all
·capital crimes."

@"

Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement
. of the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration of Justice in North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Ja.n. 1949).
The 1949 session of the General Assembly of North
Carolina adopted the proposed modifications of its rape
and murder statutes. Although in subsequent years numerous bills were introduced in the legislature to further
. . . or abolish the death penalty in North arolina,
they were rejected as were two 1969 proposals to return
to mandatory death sentences for all capital offenses.
See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 441, 194 S. E. 2d 19,
26 (opinion of the Court); 282 N. C., at 45~57, 194
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S. E. 2d, at 32- 33 (Bobbitt, C. J., concurring in part and
· dissenting in part).
'Z eHn *b! 'QeWI-'I•Pda-i•ien ~ ie fer-a·, ih )ln\th
1

Carolin~n~-the-eonstitution~

: ei the St·~prellalt.y....sta.tu~~luded th~

· F..uanan-~-t~nee air ii~e•Oti~80"'a.u
thorizing jury l discretioRTbut.atlu"t- . "ihet'rema.itldel'~the ,
statute with -death as"the mandatory punishment·
remains in··1ull· fo1'ee--and effect:<J... State· . Wadde'U;"'28Z
~*l at..M.:L445,, l94 S .. E.~; · a.t
- ·. IfP"I-974, -the
North · · Ca:rolin&.. ~ugislature~•'loUowoo ·:.the · OOll~
viously found «>nstitutionak!wrw.nldeU~nd :enacted ·a
· fttst-de.gree m.t.u;der:...p~o,yisioJl:identical tO"'the mandatory_,.
· statute il1 · operatiorr~-prior t<r-ther.a.uthoriZRtiorr-·of"'jury·•
discfmiotr." The State's brief in this case relates that
the legislature sought to remove "all sentencing discre. tion [so that] there would be no successful Furman
based attack upon the North Carolina statute."
It is now well established that the Eighth Amendment
draws much of its meaning from "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S~, at 101 (plurality
opinion) . As the above discussion makes clear, one of
the most significant developments in our society's
treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection
of the common-law practice of inexorably imposing a
death sentence upon every person convicted of a specified offense. North Carolina's mandatory death penalty
statute for first-degree murder departs markedly from
contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the
1"" • ·Jj 1 g '
1 d1 h punishment of death and thus
cannot be applied consistently with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State'S'
p0\'>'er to punish "be exercised \vithin the limits of civil(standardif ized-·· ·
" !d., at 100. F "
I

I

•

I
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As noted above, suprn p. 4, when the Supreme Court of North
Carolina analyzed the constitutionality of the State's death
• penalty statute following this Court's decision in Furman, it
severed the 1949 proviso authorizing jury sentencing discretion
and held that "the remainder of the statute with death as the
mandatory punishment . . . remains in full force and effect."
State v. Waddell, 282 N.C., at 444-445, 194

S.E.2d~,

North Carolina General Assembly then followed the
found constitutional

at 28. The

course ~~.~~~~-.~

in Waddell and enacted a first-degree

murder provision identical to the mandatory statute in operation
prior to the authorization of jury discretion.

P.

~add footnote
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36 /
Dissenting opinions in this case and in Roberts v.
Louisiana, post, argue that this conclusion is "simply mistaken" because the American rejection of mandatory death sentence statutes
might possibly be ascribable to "some maverick juries or jurors."
Post at 4, 8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Roberts v. Louisiana,
post, at 25 (White , J., dissenting). Since acquittals no less than
convictions required unanimity and citizens with moral reservations
concerning the death penalty were regularly excluded from capital
juries, it seems hardly conceivable that the persistent
.

-~

refusal of American juries to convict palpably guilty defend-

ants of capital offenses under mandatory death sentence statutes merely
"represented the intransigence of only a small minority" of jurors.
Post at '7 (Rehnquist, J. , dissenting). Moreover, the dissenting opinirns
simply ignore the experience under discretionary death sentence statutes
indicating that juries reflecting contemporary community values,
Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n. 15, found the death
penalty appropriate for only a small minority of convicted first degree
murderers. See note 31 supra. We think it evident that the uniform
assessment of the historical record by members of this Court beginning
in 1899 in Winston v. United States, supra, and continuing through the

footnote 3 6 - continued

dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun
~\l.l
four years ago in Furman, see pp. lA-1~ & n. 3~ supra, provide
a far more cogent and persuasive explanation of the American rejection of mandatory death sentences than do the speculations in
today's dissenting opinions.

.

'

'·
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A se~rate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory
death sentence statute is its failure to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to Furman's rejection of
unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences. Central to the limited holding in Furman was
the conviction that the vesting of standardless sentencing
power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 309310 (STEWART, J., concurring); id., at 313 (WHITE, J.,
concurring); cf. id., at 253-257 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also id., at 398-399 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting). It is argued that North Carolina has remedied
the inadequacies of the death penalty statutes held unconstitutional in Furman by withdrawing all sentencing
discretion from juries in capital cases. But when one
considers the long and consistent American experience
with the death penalty in first-degree murder cases·, it
becomes evident that mandatory statutes enacted in response to Furman have simply papered over the problem
of unguided and unchecked Jury discretion.
As we have noted in Part III-A. supra, there is general agreement that American juries have )Prsistentl
that o ffensi).__ refused to convict a significant portion of first-deg~e persons charged
--------mu~d~ under mandatory death penalty statutes. ~
, supra p. 18
rorthC9."rOTma study commissioiD,!eported
th~-~
~
~=~=;..,..:;
......;'~
juries in that state "[q]uite freQ'uently'' were deterred
from rendering guilty verdicts of first-degree murder because of the enormity of the sentence automatically imposed. Moreover, as a matter of historic fact, juries
operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority
of first-degree murder cases~ In view of the historic

G£

__

Cili

®

-,Seen . ~1,

sup1'f1,
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. . .,......--· many "'j ur'ie s msu- .
record, it is only reasonable to assume that ?•n.• ~ under mandatory
_,.. a it 111 i d th
?H'r* t'd l
rM••if•r- statutes will
<W•n l r ,]@ PM OBI. r 1il1rll8: S?Pl:i"SfiQaJ 14 n•z continue to
,_,,lllll'lri••• *••B I
u . .MI!iliiPiaf*' a
consider the
~ -\'Jf'.i'ttttltii•ti~ ..... North Carolina's mandatory
grave consequen death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the ces of a con vicjury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine
reachin g
whichh.murderers shall live and which shall die. And a ve:_~.!;:_t:.:~I

••••hi

(iirst-degree)

tion in

there is no way under the North Carolina law for the
judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exerci~ of
that power through a review of death sentences.t<. Instead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified
in Furman by resting the penalty determination on the
pa.rticular jury's willingness to act lawlessly. While a
mandatory death penalty statute may. reasonably be expected to increase the number of persons sentenced to
death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement by
replacing arbitrary and wanton ,jury .discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable th<:> process for imposing a sentence of
·death.

{38)
~""-··"

c

A third constitutional shortcoming of the ~orth Carolina statute is its failure t.o allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant before the imposition
upon him of a sentence of death. In Furman,~~
of the Court acknowledged what cannot fairly be de- ~
nied-that death is a punishment different from all other
sanctions in kind rather than degree. See 408 U. S.,
at 286-291 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 306'
(STEWAHT, J., concurring). A process that accords no
significance to relevant facets of the character and record-

@,..3~8~--,. Se.t' Gregg v. Georqia. -..2"f:=-'::-::..:,=::~---~[~L-;;n:-;t:~e~:·-~:p;:-p-.-;4~!.;:3
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of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing
the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death.
This Court has previously recognized that "[f]or the
determination of sentences, justice .generally requires
consideration of more than the particular acts by which
the crime was committed and that there be taken into
account the circumstances of the offense together with
the character and propensities of th.c....Qffender." Penn- ::.;..')
81Jlvania v. Ashe, 302 u.s. 4'C~(i937) :- c~atio'ii"1 SIJ ~
of both the offender and tlte offense i11 order to arrive "'""· ...,....._ · ·
at a. just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a
progressive and humanizing development. See Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-249 (1949); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U. S., at 402-403 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting). While the prevailing practice of individualizing
sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative,
we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 100 (plurality opinion),
requires t1'M' consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particu1ar ot'fe.nse ~ a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process cfft inflicting the penalty of death.
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-

'·'
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year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the de~
termination that death is the appropriate punishment
w 1na speCificcase.1
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death
sentences imposed upon the petitioners under North Carolimt.'s mandatory death sentence statute violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must
~ - --oe-se£-aside:¥. The judgment of the
Su-.
~
preme CourtLis rever8ed msofar as it upheld tlie eat
sentences imposed upon the petitioners, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.

®.

_ .....,Our determination that the death sent ences in this case were
imposed under procedures that violated constitutional standards
makes it unnecessary to reach the question wh ether imposition of
the death penalty on petitioner Woodson would haYe been so disproportionate in compari ~ on in the nature of his invoh·emr nt in
the capital offt>nsc as independently to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. SPC Gregg Y. Georgia, U. S . - , - .
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ante, p. 30.

\..~

p. 2~, footnote 39 - Insert 4
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion proceeds
on the faulty premise that if, as we hold in Gregg v. Georgia, ante ,
the penalty of death is not invariably a cruel and unusual punishment
for the crime of murder, then it must be a proportionate and appropriate punishment for any and every murderer. regardless of the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the offender .
See post at p P· 20-21.
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'.jn:prtutt <lfmtrl ltf tJrt 'Jfui:ttb ;§ta.tts

jia:slrhtghtt4 ~. QI. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 29, 1976

Re:

No. 75-5491 - Woodson v. North Carolina

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

$5u.prtmt <!}curt cf tqt 1ffttitt~ ;ittras
'~hullrington. ~.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 29, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 75-5491 -Woodson, et al., Petitioners v.
North Carolina

Attached is a Xerox revision of Part III of my dissenting opinion in this case. Pages 10 through the third line
of page 18 of the attached are a substitute for pages 10
through the sentence ending on the seventh line of page 14
of the original.
Sincerely,

Attachment

To: The Chief Justice
Mr.
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Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Brennan
Stewart
White
Marshall
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens

Erom: Mr. Justice Blackmun
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MR . JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting .

I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Furman

v. Georgia, 4 08 U.S. 238, 4 05-414 (1972), and in the other dissenting

opinions I joined in that case .

Id., at 375, 414 and 465 .

To: Tne
Mr.
Mr.
Mr .
Mr .

Chief Justice
Justi ce Brennan
Justi.ce St ewart
Justice Marshal l
Justice Blackmun
.~. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rohnquis t
Mr . Justice Stevens
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Fr om: Mr . Justice Wi1ite

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:~ rcul at ed : _ __

No. 75-5491
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James Tyrone Woodson
and Luby Waxton,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
Supreme Court of North
v.
Carolina.
State of North Carolina.
[June -, 1976]

MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE J
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972),
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect
of that case on the North Carolina criminal statutes
which imposed the death penalty for first-degree murder
and other crimes but \Vhich provided that "if the jury
shall so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct
the jury." State v. Waddell, 282 N. C. 431 , 194 S. E.
2d 19 ( 1973), determined that Furman v. Georgia invalidated only the proviso giving the jury the power to limit
the penalty to life imprisonment and that thenceforward
death was the mandatory penalty for the specified capital
crimes. Thereafter N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14--17 was
amended to eliminate the express dispensing power of the
jury and to add kidnapping to the underlying felonies
for which death is the specified penalty. As amended,
the section reads as follows :
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means
of poison , lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed

.•
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in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other
felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first
degree and shall be punished with death. All other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison."

It was under this statute that the petitioners in this case
were convicted of first-degree murder and the mandatory
death sentence imposed.
The facts of record and the proceedings in this case
leading to petitioners' convictions for first-degree murder
and their death sentence appear in the opinion of MR.
JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR. JusTICE
STEVENS (hereinafter the plurality). The issues in the
case are very similar, if not identical, to those in Roberts
v. Louisiana, post. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in that case, I reject petitioners' arguments
that the death penalty in any circumstances is a violation
of the Eighth Amendment and that the North Carolina
statute, although making the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory upon proof of guilt and a verdict of
first-degree murder, will nevertheless resuit in the death
penalty being imposed so seldom and a.r bitrarily that it is
void under Furman v. Georgia. As is also app-arent from
my dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, I also disagree with the two additional grounds which the plurality·
sua sponte offers for invalidating the North Carolina;
statute. I would affirm the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court..

\
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To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice SteNart
M~. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun
r. Justice Powell
r. Justice Rehnqu1st
Mr. Justice Stevena
From: Mr. Justice Mar shall
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·suPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75-5491
James Tyrone Woodson
and Luby Waxton,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
Supreme Court of North
Carolina.
v.
'State of North Carolina.
[June -, 1976]
JusTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in
•Gregg v. Georgia, U. S. - , (1976) , I am of
the view that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. I therefote concur in the Court's
.judgment.
MR.

..
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Petitioners in this case were convicted of participation
in an armed robbery

of a convenience food store, in the course

of which the cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded.
There were four participants in the robbery: the petitioners
Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton, and two others, Leonard Tucker
and Johnnie Lee Carroll . . Tucker and Carroll testified for the
prosecution after being permitted to plead guilty to lesser
offenses; Woodson and Waxton testified on their own behalf.

The

stories told by Woodson, Tucker and Carroll were generally consistent; Waxton's differed in some respects.
According .to the testimony, the four men had been' discussing a possible robbery for some time.

On the day of the

robbery, June 3, 1974, Woodson and Tucker drank two bottles of
'

wine together.

Woodson then left Tucker a'n d went over to the mobile

home where he was staying with a friend, Brenda Pegues.
Brenda then drank some beer together.
and Tucker came to the trailer.

He and

About 9:30p.m., Waxton

It is undisputed that Waxton

hit Woodson after he came out of the trailer.

Waxton testified

that he did it because Woodson said something to "disre'spect"
him; Tucker and Woodson testified it was to make Woodson sober
up and come along on the robbery.
The three went to Waxton's trailer where they met Carroll,
who had borrowed his brother George Wiliie's car for the evening.
Waxton, according to the testimony of the others, armed himself
with a nickel-plated derringer.

Tucker handed Woodson a rifle,

which he carried into the front seat of the car.
set out.

The four then

Carroll was driving, with Woodson in the front seat

next to him.

Tucker and Waxton rode in the back seat.

The first

time they came to the store, they went on by because there were
too many customers.

They went up a dirt road where Woodson got

No. 75-5491

out of the car and tested the rifle by firing it twice into the
ground.

They then returned to the store.
Tucker and

Waxto~

got out of the car and went into the

store while Carroll and Woodson remained outside as lookouts.
According to Tucker, whose story was partly corroborated by Carroll
and Woodson, Tucker asked for, received, and paid for a package
of Kools.

Waxton in turn asked for cigarettes.

As the cashier,

Mrs. Shirley Whittington Butler, handed the pack to him, Waxton
pulled the derringer out of his hip pocket, placed it, against
Mrs. Butler's neck and fired one shot.
wards.

Mrs. Butler fell back-

Waxton took the money· tray from the register and gave

it to Tucker, who carried it from the store.

As he reached the

door, Tucker ran into one R. N. Stancil, said "look out" and
pushed past him.

After he was outside, Tucker heard a second

shot from inside the store, and a couple of minutes later Waxton
came out, walking fast and carrying a handful of paper money.
Tucker and Waxton got in the car and the four drove away.
Waxton's testimony accorded with this testimony in most
respects, save that he claimed he never had a gun and Tucker had
shot both Mrs. Butler and Mr. Stancil.
The four men were arrested and indicted for first degree
murder and armed robbery.

Waxton was also indicted for assault

with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill, not resulting in death.
This charge arose form the wounding of the customer R.N. Stancil.
Before the trial of the two petitioners, Tucker and Carroll had

1/
both been permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses-

and

1/
Tucker was allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory
after the fact to murder and to armed robbery.
He was sentenced
to 10 years imprisonment on the first charge, and to not less
than 20 nor more than 30 on the second.
The charges are to run
concurrently.

- 2 -
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had agreed to testify for the prosecution.

During trial

Waxton asked to be allowed to plead guilty to the same lesser
offenses to which Tucker ha'd plea ded guilty, but the Solicitor

2/
refuse_? to accept the pleas.-

11\Toodson maintained throughout

--

the trial that he had been coerced by Waxt6n, that he was therefore innocent, and that he would not consider pleading guilty
to anything.
Petitioners were found guilty on all charges, and, as
was required by the statute, sentenced to death.
Court of North Carolina affirmed.
607, 287 N.C. 578 (1975).

The Suoreme

State v. Woodson, 215 S.E.2d

We granted certiorari,

u.s.

to consider whether the imposition of the death penalty in these
cases comports with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

2/
The Solicitor gave no reason for refusing to~cept
Waxton's offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. However,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in finding that the
.Solicitor did not abuse his discretion, noted:
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed
the robbery and that he fired the shots which
killed Mrs. Butler and wounded Mr. Stancil is
overwhelming. No extenuating circumstances gave
the solicitor any incentive to accept the plea
he tendered at the close of the State's evidence.

*

*

*

"Finally, we note that Waxton and Woodson were
adults, aged 24 and 23 respectively; Tucker and
Carroll were still in their teens, aged 18 and
19 respectively.
Carroll was obviously impressed by Waxton, his older brother who, after
an absence of eight years, had returned from New
Jersey with a knowledge of karate and much other
information he was no doubt willing to impart to
a younger brother willing to learn." State v.
Woodson and Waxton, 287 N.C. 578, 595-596; 215
S.E.2d 607,
(1975).

)
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North Carolina, prior to 1972, provided that in cases
of first degree murder, the jury could in its unbridled discretion
choose whether the convicted defendant should be sentenced to
3/
death or to life imprisonment.After the decision of this
Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme
Court of North Carolina considered the effect of Furman on the
state capital felony statutes.

In State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431,

194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), it concluded that the holding of Furman was
simply that the death penalty could not be imposed by a judge or
jury who was free to impose it arbitrarily, but not that the
death penalty was per se cruel and unusual.

It then held that

the section of the death penalty statutes which gave the jury
the option of returning a

verdic~

of guilty without capital

punishment was unconstitutional, but that the provision was
severable so that the statutes survived as mandatory death penalty
statutes.

!/

3/
The murder statute in effect in North Carolina until
1973 read as follows:
" § 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.
-A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be dccmcci
to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death: Provided, if at
the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, th<'
punishment shall be impri sonment for life in the State's prison, and the cour~ shall
so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murd er shall be deemed murder m the
second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment· of not less than two nor
more than thirty years in the State's prison r." · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14 -l 7

(1969 repl. volume)'.
4/
The Court characterized the effect of the statute without
the defective sections as follows:
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of
any such offense, the court must impose a sentence
of death.
The punishment to be imposed for these
capital felonies is no longer a discretionary
question for the jury and therefore no longer a
proper subject for an instruction by the judge."
282 N.C. at 445.

- 4 -
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The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 followed
the court's lead in enacting a new· version of N.C. Gen. Stat.
14-17 which was essentially unchanged from the prior version
-5/
exce'pt _in making the death penalty mandatory.Section 14-17
§

now reads as follows:

"Murder in the first and
second degree defined; punishment.-A murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying
in wait. imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony shall be
deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall
be punished with death. All other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
two years nor more than life imprisonment in the
State's prison."

It was under this staute that petitioners(, who corrunitted
their crime on June '3,_ 1974,. were tried,. convicted and sentenced
to death.

)
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To:
From :

Date:

File

July 12, 1976

Chris 1·f uitman
CAPITAL CASES -- 1975 TERM
In these cases, our primary responsibilit y was for

Parts I, II, and III in No . 74-6257, Gregg v. Georgia .
The development of the analysis for all five opinions, however,
was a joint

e~fort

of the Powell, Stewart, and Stevens chambers.

Justice Stewart's chambers took primary responsibilit y for
Part IV of Gregg and Part III in the other four cases .

Justice

Stevens took primary responsibility for Part I in the four
non-Gregg cases.

Substantial editing was done by all

three chambers on all parts of the five opinions.

